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Blockchain platforms are coming into broad use for processing critical transactions among participants who
have not established mutual trust. Many blockchains are programmable, supporting smart contracts, which
maintain persistent state and support transactions that transform the state. Unfortunately, bugs in many
smart contracts have been exploited by hackers. Obsidian is a novel programming language with a type
system that enables static detection of bugs that are common in smart contracts today. Obsidian is based
on a core calculus, Silica, for which we proved type soundness. Obsidian uses typestate to detect improper
state manipulation and uses linear types to detect abuse of assets. We describe two case studies that evaluate
Obsidian’s applicability to the domains of parametric insurance and supply chain management, finding that
Obsidian’s type system facilitates reasoning about high-level states and ownership of resources. We compared
our Obsidian implementation to a Solidity implementation, observing that the Solidity implementation requires
much boilerplate checking and tracking of state, whereas Obsidian does this work statically.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchains have been proposed to address security and robustness objectives in contexts that
lack shared trust. By recording all transactions in a tamper-resistant ledger, blockchains attempt
to facilitate secure, trusted computation in a network of untrusted peers. Blockchain programs,
sometimes called smart contracts [Szabo 1997], can be deployed; once deployed, they can maintain
state in the ledger. For example, a program might represent a bank account and store a quantity of
virtual currency. Clients could conduct transactions with bank accounts by invoking the appropriate
interfaces. Each transaction is appended permanently to the ledger. In this paper, we refer to a
deployment of a smart contract as an object or contract instance.
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1:2 Coblenz et al.
Proponents have suggested that blockchains be used for a plethora of applications, such as
finance, health care [Harvard Business Review 2017], supply chain management [IBM 2019], and
others [Elsden et al. 2018]. For example [Dieterich et al. 2017], an electronics manufacturer might
accept shipments of components from a variety of manufacturers; if any of those components
have been replaced with fraudulent components somewhere in the chain of custody, then the
manufactured systems might include defects, including security vulnerabilities. A blockchain could
provide a tamper-resistant mechanism for recording signed transactions showing every entity that
was ever responsible for each component.
Unfortunately, some prominent blockchain applications have included security vulnerabilities,
for example through which over $80 million worth of virtual currency was stolen [Graham 2017;
Sirer 2016]. In addition to the potentially severe consequences of bugs, platforms require that
contracts be immutable, so bugs cannot be fixed easily. If organizations are to adopt blockchain
environments for business-critical applications, there needs to be a more reliable way of writing
smart contracts.
Many techniques promote program correctness, but our focus is on programming language
design so that we can prevent bugs as early as possible — potentially by aiding the programmer’s
reasoning processes before code is even written. Because of our interest in developing a language
that would be effective for programmers, we designed a surface language, Obsidian, in addition to a
core calculus, Silica. Obsidian stands for Overhauling Blockchains with States to Improve Development
of Interactive Application Notation. Our design is based on formative studies with programmers,
and although those studies are not the focus of this paper, our goal of usability drove us to focus on
features that provide powerful safety guarantees while maintaining as much simplicity as possible.
In this paper, we focus on the design of the language itself and make only brief mention of our
observations in our user studies. For more detail regarding the user studies, readers may refer to
[Barnaby et al. 2017].
Obsidian is a programming language for smart contracts that provides strong compile-time
features to prevent bugs. Obsidian is based on a novel type system that uses typestate to statically
ensure that objects are manipulated correctly according to their current states, and uses linear
types [Wadler 1990] to enable safe manipulation of assets, which must not be accidentally lost. We
prove key soundness theorems so that Silica can serve as a trustworthy foundation for Obsidian
and potentially other typestate-oriented languages.
We make the following contributions:
(1) We show how typestate and linear types can be combined in a user-facing programming
language, using a rich but simple permission system that captures the required restrictions
on aliases.
(2) We show an integrated architecture for supporting both smart contracts and client programs.
By enabling both on-blockchain and off-blockchain programs to be created with the same
language, we ensure safety properties of the language are available for data structures that
must be transferred off-blockchain as well as for those stored in the blockchain.
(3) We describe Silica, the core calculus that underlies Obsidian. We prove type soundness and
asset retention for Silica. Asset retention is the property that owning references to assets
(objects that the programmer has designated have value) cannot be lost accidentally. Silica is
the first typestate calculus (of which we are aware) that supports assets.
(4) As case studies, we show how Obsidian can be used to implement a parametric insurance
application and a supply chain. By comparison to Solidity, we show how leveraging typestate
can move checks from run time to compile time. Our case studies were implemented by
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programmers who were not the designers of the language, showing that the language is
usable by people other than only the designers.
After summarizing related work, we introduce the Obsidian language with an example (§3).
Section 4 focuses on the design of particular aspects of the language and describes how qualitative
studies influenced our design. We describe how the language design fits into the Fabric blockchain
infrastructure in §5. Section 6 describes Silica, the core calculus underlying Obsidian, and its proof
of soundness (though the proof itself is in the Appendix). We discuss two case studies in §7, showing
how we have collaborated with external stakeholders to demonstrate the expressiveness and utility
of Obsidian. Future work is discussed in §8. We conclude in §9.
2 RELATEDWORK
Researchers have previously investigated common causes of bugs in smart contracts [Atzei et al.
2016; Delmolino et al. 2015; Luu et al. 2016], created static analyses for existing languages [Kalra
et al. 2018], and worked on applying formal verification [Bhargavan et al. 2016]. Our work focuses
on preventing bugs in the first place by designing a language in which many commonplace bugs
can be prevented as a result of properties of the type system. This enables programmers to reason
more effectively about relevant safety properties and enables the compiler to detect many relevant
bugs.
There is a large collection of proposals for new smart contract languages, cataloged by Harz
and Knottenbelt [2018]. One of the languages most closely related to Obsidian is Flint [Schrans
et al. 2019]. Flint supports a notion of typestate, but lacks a permission system that, in Obsidian,
enables flexible, static reasoning about aliases. Flint supports a trait called Asset, which enhances
safety for resources to protect them from being duplicated or destroyed accidentally. However,
Flint models assets as traits rather than as linear types due to the aliasing issues that this would
introduce [Schrans and Eisenbach 2019]. This leads to significant limitations on assets in Flint.
For example, in Flint, assets cannot be returned from functions. Obsidian addresses these issues
with a permission system, and thus permits any non-primitive type to be an asset and treated as a
first-class value.
There are also proposals for blockchain languages that are more domain-specific. For example,
Hull et al. propose formalizing a notion of business artifacts for blockchains [Hull et al. 2016].
DAML [Digital Asset, Inc. 2019] is more schema-oriented, requiring users to write schemata for
their data models. In DAML, which was inspired by financial agreements, contracts specify who
can conduct and observe various operations and data.
The problem of aliasing in object-oriented languages has led to significant research on ways to
constrain and reason about aliases [Clarke et al. 2013]. Unfortunately, these approaches can be very
complex. For example, fractional permissions [Boyland 2003] provide an algebra of permissions to
memory cells. These permissions can be split among multiple references so that if the references
are combined, one can recover the original (whole) permission. However, aside from the simple
approach of reference counting, general fractional permissions have not been adopted in practical
languages, perhaps because using them requires understanding a complex algebraic system.
A significant line of research has focused on ownership types [Clarke et al. 1998], which refers
to a different notion of ownership than we use in Obsidian. Ownership types aim to enforce
encapsulation by ensuring that the implementation of an object cannot leak outside its owner. In
Obsidian, we are less concerned with encapsulation and more focused on sound typestate semantics.
This allows us to avoid the strict nature of these encapsulation-based approaches while accepting
their premise: typically, good architecture results in an aliasing structure in which one "owner“ of
a particular object controls the object’s lifetime and, likely, many of the changes to the object.
1:4 Coblenz et al.
Xu et al. [2017] gives a taxonomy of blockchain systems, but the focus is on blockchain platforms,
i.e. systems that maintain blockchains and process transactions. The architectural implications of
Obsidian are at the application layer, not at the system layer.
Fickle [Drossopoulou et al. 2001] was a one approach to allowing objects to change class at
runtime, but Fickle did not allow references to include any type specifications pertaining to the
states of the referenced objects. DeLine investigated using typestate in the context of object-oriented
systems [DeLine and Fähndrich 2004], finding that subclassing causes complicated issues of partial
state changes; we avoid that problem by not supporting subclassing. Plaid [Sunshine et al. 2011]
and Plural [Bierhoff and Aldrich 2008] are the most closely-related systems in terms of their type
systems’ features. Both languages were complex, and the authors noted the complexity in certain
cases, e.g., fractional permissions make the language harder to use but were rarely used, and even
then primarily for concurrency [Bierhoff et al. 2011]. Sunshine et al. showed typestate to be helpful
in documentation when users need to understand object protocols [Sunshine et al. 2014]; we used
that conclusion as motivation for our language design.
Gordon et al. [2012] describes a type system for enabling safe concurrency. In addition to
not supporting reasoning about object protocols, these systems sometimes introduce significant
restrictions in order to handle concurrency. This is warranted in those contexts, but because
blockchain systems are now always sequential, this complexity is not needed. For example, isolated
references in Gordon et al. [2012] do not allow readonly (readable) aliases to mutable objects
reachable from the isolated references; owned references in Obsidian have no such restriction
because Obsidian is not designed to support concurrency.
Linear types, which facilitate reasoning about resources, have been studied in depth sinceWadler’s
1990 paper [Wadler 1990], but have not been adopted inmany programming languages. Rust [Mozilla
Research 2015] is one exception, using a form of linearity to restrict aliases to mutable objects.
This limited use of linearity did not require the language to support as rich a permission system as
Obsidian does; for example, Rust types cannot directly express states of referenced objects. Alms
[Tov and Pucella 2011] is an ML-like language that supports linear types; unlike Obsidian, it is not
object-oriented. Session types [Caires and Pfenning 2010] are another way of approaching linear
types in programming languages, as in Concurrent C0 [Willsey et al. 2017]. However, session types
are more directly suited for communicating, concurrent processes, which is very different from a
sequential, stateful setting as is the case with blockchains.
Silica, the core of Obsidian, is based on Featherweight Typestate (FT) [Garcia et al. 2014]. However,
since Silica is designed as the core of a user-facing programming language, there are significant
differences because we wanted to formalize particular operations that we found convenient in the
surface language. For example, Silica replaces FT’s atomic field swap with field assignment. This
allows fields that temporarily have modes that differ from their declarations, facilitating a style of
programming that our participants preferred in our formative user studies. This approach is related
to the approach taken in Naden et al. [2012], where fields can be unpacked, but in Silica, unpacking
is only possible via the this reference in order to maintain encapsulation.
Support for dynamic state tests is an important feature in order to facilitate practical programming.
Support for these dynamic state tests has been found to be critical for expressiveness in other
object-oriented contexts as well [Bierhoff et al. 2009]. Unlike in FT, Silica supports expressions that
execute dynamic state tests so that programs can branch according to the result.
Other differences with FT are shown in Table 1.
Although the user-centered design aspects of Obsidian are not the focus of this paper, others
have had success applying these methods to tools for developers. For example, [Myers et al. 2016]
argued that human-centered methods could be used in a variety of different tools for software
engineers. Pane, Myers, and Miller used HCI techniques to design a programming language for
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Featherweight Typestate Silica
pure references cannot be used to
mutate fields of referenced objects
Unowned references are only as restricted as necessary
for soundness: they cannot be used to change nominal
state but can be used to write fields
No dynamic state tests Dynamic state tests
Types integrate state guarantees,
but do not separate state from class
Separate contract and state constructs
Inheritance No inheritance
Typestate is integrated with class Typestate implies ownership
No linear assets Linear assets with explicit disown
Table 1. Key differences between Featherweight Typestate and Silica.
children [Pane et al. 2002]. Stefik and Siebert used an empirical, quantitative approach regarding
the design of syntax [Stefik and Siebert 2013].
3 INTRODUCTION TO THE OBSIDIAN LANGUAGE
Obsidian is based on several guidelines for the design of smart contract languages identified in
Coblenz et al. [2019]. Briefly, those guidelines are:
• Strong static safety: bugs are particularly serious when they occur in smart contracts. In
general, it can be impossible to fix bugs in deployed smart contracts because of the immutable
nature of blockchains. Obsidian emphasizes a novel, strong, static type system in order to
detect important classes of bugs at compile time. Among common classes of bugs is loss of
assets, such as virtual currency.
• User-centered design: a proposed language should be as usable as possible. We integrated
feedback from users in order to maximize users’ effectiveness with Obsidian.
• Blockchain-agnosticism: blockchain platforms are still in their infancies and new ones enter
and leave the marketplace regularly. Being a significant investment, a language design should
target properties that are common to many blockchain platforms.
We were particularly interested in creating a language that we would eventually be able to
evaluate with users, while at the same time significantly improving safety relative to existing
language designs. In short, we aimed to create a language that we could show was more effective for
programmers. In order to make this practical, we made some relatively standard surface-level design
choices that would enable our users to learn the core language concepts more easily, while using
a sophisticated type system to provide strong guarantees. Where possible, we chose approaches
that would enable static enforcement of safety, but in a few cases we moved checks to runtime in
order to enable a simple design for users or a more precise analysis (for example, in dynamic state
checks, §4.5).
Typestate-oriented programming [Aldrich et al. 2009] has been proposed to allow specification
of protocols in object-oriented settings. For example, a File can only be read when it is in the Open
state, not when it is in the Closed state. By lifting these specifications into types, typestate-oriented
programming languages allow static checking of adherence to protocols and improve the ability of
programmers to reason effectively about how to use the interfaces correctly [Sunshine et al. 2014].
Featherweight Typestate [Garcia et al. 2014] is a core calculus for a class of typestate languages.
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However, we found in user studies that our early prototypes of Obsidian, which were based on
a simplified version of this calculus, led to significant user confusion. In order to address these
problems, we elicited requirements for blockchain languages that motivated the design of a new
formalism. We designed Silica, a new typestate calculus that, despite its simplicity, still allows users
to express nearly all the properties that earlier typestate calculi enabled. Silica also supports key
features that we observed users expected to have, such as dynamic state tests and field assignment.
We selected an object-oriented approach because smart contracts inevitably implement state
that is mutated over time, and object-oriented programming is well-known to be a good match to
this kind of situation. This approach is also a good starting point for our users, who likely have
some object-oriented programming experience. However, in order to improve safety relative to
traditional designs, Obsidian omits inheritance, which is error-prone due to the fragile base class
problem [Mikhajlov and Sekerinski 1998]. We leveraged some features of the C-family syntax,
such as blocks delimited with curly braces, dots for separating references from members, etc., to
improve learnability for some of our target users. Following blockchain convention, Obsidian uses
the keyword contract rather than class. Because of the transactional semantics of invocations on
blockchain platforms, Obsidian uses the term transaction rather than method. Transactions can
require that their arguments, including the receiver, be in specific states in order for the transaction
to be invoked.
Since smart contracts frequently manipulate assets, such as cryptocurrencies, we designed
Obsidian to support linear types [Wadler 1990], which allow the compiler to ensure that assets are
neither duplicated nor lost accidentally. These linear types integrate consistently with typestate,
since typestate-bearing references are affine (i.e. cannot be duplicated but can be dropped as needed).
A particular innovation in this approach is the fusion of linear references to assets with affine
references to non-assets. Whether a reference is linear or affine depends on the declaration of the
type to which the reference refers.
The example in Fig. 1 shows some of the key features of Obsidian. TinyVendingMachine is a
main contract, so it can be deployed independently to a blockchain. A TinyVendingMachine has
a very small inventory: just one candy bar. It is either Full, with one candy bar in inventory,
or Empty. Clients may invoke buy on a vending machine that is in Full state, passing a Coin as
payment. When buy is invoked, the caller must initially own the Coin, but after buy returns, the
caller no longer owns it. buy returns a Candy to the caller, which the caller then owns. After buy
returns, the vending machine is in state Empty.
Smart contracts commonly manipulate assets, such as virtual currencies. Some common smart
contract bugs pertain to accidental loss of assets [Delmolino et al. 2015]. If a contract in Obsidian
is declared with the asset keyword, then the type system requires that every instance of that
contract have exactly one owner. This enables the type checker to report an error if an owned
reference goes out of scope. For example, assuming that Coin was declared as an asset, if the
author of the buy transaction had accidentally omitted the deposit call, the type checker would
have reported the loss of the asset in the buy transaction. Any contract that has an Owned reference
to another asset must itself be an asset.
To enforce this, references to objects have types according to both the contract of the referenced
object and amode, which denotes information about ownership. Modes are separated from contract
names with an @ symbol. Exactly one reference to each asset contract instance must beOwned; this
reference must not go out of scope. For example, an owned reference to a Coin object can be written
Coin@Owned. Ownership can be transferred between references via assignment or transaction
invocation. The compiler outputs an error if a reference to an asset goes out of scope while it is
Owned. Ownership can be explicitly discarded with the disown operator.
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1 // This vending machine sells candy in exchange for candy tokens.
2 main asset contract TinyVendingMachine {
3 // Fields defined at the top level are in scope in all states.
4 Coins @ Owned coinBin;
5
6 state Full {
7 // inventory is only in scope when the object is in Full state.
8 Candy @ Owned inventory;
9 }
10 state Empty; // No candy if the machine is empty.
11
12 TinyVendingMachine () {
13 coinBin = new Coins (); // Start with an empty coin bin.
14 ->Empty;
15 }
16
17 transaction restock(TinyVendingMachine @ Empty >> Full this ,
18 Candy @ Owned >> Unowned c) {
19 ->Full(inventory = c);
20 }
21
22 transaction buy(TinyVendingMachine @ Full >> Empty this ,
23 Coin @ Owned >> Unowned c) returns Candy @ Owned {
24 coinBin.deposit(c);
25 Candy result = inventory;
26 ->Empty;
27 return result;
28 }
29
30 transaction withdrawCoins () returns Coins @ Owned {
31 Coins result = coinBin;
32 coinBin = new Coins ();
33 return result;
34 }
35 }
Fig. 1. A tiny vending machine implementation, showing key features of Obsidian.
Unowned is the complement to Owned: an object has at most one Owned reference but an
arbitrary number of Unowned references. Unowned references are not linear, as they do not
convey ownership. They are nonetheless useful. For example, a Wallet object might have owning
references to Money objects, but a Budget object might have Unowned aliases to those objects so
that the value of the Money can be tracked (even though only the Wallet is permitted to transfer
the objects to another owner). Alternatively, if there is no owner of a non-asset object, it may have
Shared and Unowned aliases. Examples of these scenarios are shown in Fig. 2 to provide some
intuition.
In Obsidian, themode portion of a type can change due to operations on a reference, so transaction
signatures can specify modes both before and after execution. As in Java, a first argument called
this is optional; when present, it is used to specify initial and final modes on the receiver. The≫
symbol separates the initial mode from the final one. In the example above, the signature of buy
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Aliasing examples
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Object
Object@Owned
Object@Unowned
Object@Unowned
Object@Unowned
Object
Object@Shared
Object@Shared
Object@Shared
Object@Shared
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Some common aliasing scenarios. (a) shows an object with one owner; (b) shows a shared object.
(lines 22-23) indicates that buymust be invoked on a TinyVendingMachine that is statically known
to be in state Full, passing a Coin object that the caller owns. When buy returns, the receiver will
be in state Empty and the caller will no longer have ownership of the Coin argument.
Obsidian contracts can have constructors (line 10 above), which initialize fields as needed. If a
contract has any states declared, then every instance of the contract must be in one of those states
from the time each constructor exits.
Objects in smart contracts frequently maintain high-level state information [Ethereum Foun-
dation 2017], with the set of permitted transactions depending on the current state. For example,
a TinyVendingMachine might be Empty or Full, and the buy transaction can only be invoked on
a Full machine. Prior work showed that including state information in documentation helped
users understand how to use object protocols [Sunshine et al. 2014], so we include first-class
support for states in Obsidian. Typestate [Aldrich et al. 2009] is the idea of including state in-
formation in types, and we take that approach in Obsidian so that the compiler can ensure that
objects are manipulated correctly according to their states. State information can be captured in a
mode. For example, TinyVendingMachine@Full is the type of a reference to an object of contract
TinyVendingMachine with mode Full. In this case, the mode denotes that the referenced object is
statically known to be in state Full.
State is mutable; objects can transition from their current state to another state via a transition
operation. For example, ->Full(inventory = c)might change the state of a TinyVendingMachine
to the Full state, initializing the inventory field of the Full state to c. This leads to a potential
difficulty: what if a reference to a TinyVendingMachine with mode Empty exists while the state
transitions to Full? To prevent this problem, typestate is only available with references that also
have ownership. Because of this, there is no need to separately denote ownership in the syntax;
we simply observe that every typestate-bearing reference is also owned. Then, Obsidian restricts
the operations that can be performed through a reference according to the reference’s mode. In
particular, if an owned reference might exist, then non-owning references cannot be used to mutate
typestate. If no owned references exist, then all references permit state mutation. A summary of
modes is shown in Table 2.
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Mode Meaning Typestate
mutation
Owned This is the only reference to the object that is owned. There
may be many Unowned aliases but no Shared aliases.
Permitted
Unowned There may or may not be any owned aliases to this object,
but there may be many other Unowned or Shared aliases.
Forbidden
Shared This is one of potentially many Shared references to the
object. There are no owned aliases.
Permitted
state name(s) This is an owned reference and also conveys the fact that the
referenced object is in one of the specified states. There may
be Unowned aliases but no Shared or Owned aliases.
Permitted
Table 2. A summary of modes in Obsidian
4 OBSIDIAN LANGUAGE DESIGN PROCESS AND DETAILS
Obsidian is the first object-oriented language (of which we are aware) to integrate linear assets
and typestate. This combination — and, in fact, even just including typestate — could result in a
design that was hard to use, since typical typestate languages require users to understand a complex
permissions model. In designing the language, we focused on simplicity in service of usability
[Coblenz et al. 2018]. We maintained static safety where possible, but moved certain checks to
runtime where needed to maintain a high level of expressiveness. We also aimed to simplify the
job of the programmer relative to existing blockchain programming languages by eliminating
onerous, error-prone programming tasks, such as writing serialization and deserialization code.
In this section, we describe how we designed language features to improve user experience, in
some cases driven by results of formative user studies [Barnaby et al. 2017]. Some other system
features, such as serialization, are discussed in §6. Rather than relying only on our own experience
and intuition, we invited participants to help us assess the tradeoffs of different design options.
This enabled us to take a more data-driven approach in our language design, as suggested by Stefik
and Hanenberg [2014] and Coblenz et al. [2018]. We take the perspective that we should integrate
qualitative methods in addition to quantitative methods in order to drive language design in a
direction that is more likely to be beneficial for users.
4.1 Type declarations, annotations, and static assertions
Obsidian requires type declarations of local variables, fields, and transaction parameters. In addition
to providing familiarity to programmers who have experience with other object-oriented languages,
there is a hypothesis that these declarations may aid in usability by providing documentation,
particularly at interfaces [Coblenz et al. 2014]. Traditional declarations are also typical in prior
typestate-supporting languages, such as Plaid [Sunshine et al. 2011]. Unfortunately, typestate is
incompatible with the traditional semantics of type declarations: programmers normally expect
that the type of a variable always matches its declared type, but mutation can result in the typestate
no longer matching the initial type of an identifier. This violates the consistency usability heuristic
[Nielsen and Molich 1990] and is a potential source of reduced code readability, since determining
the type of an identifier can require reading all the code from the declaration to the program point
of interest.
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To alleviate this problem, we introduced static assertions. These have the syntax [e @ mode].
For example, [account @ Open] statically asserts that the reference account is owned and refers
to an object that the compiler can prove is in Open state. Furthermore, to avoid confusion about
the meanings of local variable declarations, Obsidian forbids mode specifications on local variable
declarations.
Static assertions have no implications on the dynamic semantics (and therefore have no runtime
cost); instead, they serve as checked documentation. The type checker verifies that the given mode
is valid for the expression in the place where the assertion is written. A reader of a typechecked
program can be assured, then, that the specified types are correct, and the author can insert the
assertions as needed to improve program understandability.
4.2 State transitions
Each state definition can include a list of fields, which are in scope only when the object is in the
corresponding state (see line 8 of Fig. 1). What, then, should be the syntax for initializing those
fields when transitioning to a different state? Some design objectives included:
• When an object is in a particular state, the fields for that state should be initialized.
• When an object is not in a particular state, the fields for that state should be out of scope.
• According to the user control and freedom heuristic [Nielsen and Molich 1990] and results by
Stylos et al. [Stylos and Clarke 2007], programmers should be able to initialize the fields in
any order, including by assignment. Under this criterion, it does not suffice to only permit
constructor-style simultaneous initialization.
In order to allow maximum user flexibility without compromising the integrity of the type
system, we implemented a flexible approach. When a state transition occurs, all fields of the target
state must be initialized. However, they can be initialized either in the transition (e.g., ->S(x =
a) initializes the field x to a) or prior to the transition (e.g., S::x = a; ->S). In addition, fields
that are in scope in the current state but will not be in scope in the target state must not be owned
references to assets. In those cases, ownership must be transferred to another reference or discarded
before the transition.
4.3 Transaction scope
Transactions in Obsidian are only available when the object is in a particular state. Correspondingly,
other typestate-oriented languages support defining methods inside states. For example, Plaid
[Sunshine et al. 2011] allows users to define the readmethod inside the OpenFile state to make clear
that read can only be invoked when a File is in the OpenFile state. However, this is problematic
when methods can be invoked when the object is in several states.
Barnaby et al. [2017] considered this question for Obsidian and observed that study participants,
whowere given a typestate-oriented language that includedmethods in states, askedmany questions
about what could happen during and after state transitions. They were unsure what this meant
in that context and what variables were in scope at any given time. One participant thought it
should be disallowed to call transactions available in state S1 while writing a transaction that was
lexically in state Start. For this reason, we designed Obsidian so that transactions are defined
lexically outside states. Transaction signatures indicate (via type annotations on a first argument
called this) from which states each transaction can be invoked. This approach is consistent with
other languages, such as Java, which also allows type annotations on a first argument this.
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4.4 Field type consistency
In traditional object-oriented languages, fields always reference either null or objects whose types
are subtypes of the fields’ declared types. This presents a difficulty for Obsidian, since the mode is
part of the type, and the mode can change with operations. For example, a Wallet might have a
reference of type Money@Owned. How should a programmer implement swap? One way is shown in
Fig. 3.
1 contract Wallet {
2 Money@Owned money;
3
4 transaction swap (Money @ Owned m) returns Money @ Owned {
5 Money result = money;
6 money = m;
7 return result;
8 }
9 }
Fig. 3. Obsidian’s approach for handling transitions.
The problem is that line 5 changes the type of the money field from Owned to Unowned by
transferring ownership to result. Should this be a type error, since it is inconsistent with the
declaration of money? If it is a type error, how is the programmer supposed to implement swap?
One possibility is to add another state, as shown in Fig. 4.
1 contract Wallet {
2 state Empty;
3 state Full {
4 Money @ Owned money;
5 }
6
7 transaction swap (Wallet@Full this , Money @ Owned m)
8 returns Money @ Owned
9 {
10 // Suppose the transition returns the contents of the old field.
11 Money result = ->Empty;
12 ->Full(money = m);
13 return result;
14 }
15 }
Fig. 4. An alternative approach for handling transitions.
Although this approach might seem like a reasonable consequence of the desire to keep field
values consistent with their types, it imposes a significant burden. First, the programmer is required
to introduce additional states, which leaks implementation details into the interface (unless we
mitigate this problem by making the language more complex, e.g., with private states or via
abstraction over states). Second, this requires that transitions return the newly out-of-scope fields,
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but it is not clear how: should the result be of record type? Should it be a tuple? What if the
programmer neglects to do something with the result? Plaid [Sunshine et al. 2011] addressed the
problem by not including type names in fields, but that approachmay hamper code understandability
[Coblenz et al. 2014].
In Obsidian, we permit fields to temporarily reference objects that are not consistent with the
fields’ declarations, but we require that at the end of transactions (and constructors), the fields refer
to appropriately-typed objects. This approach is consistent with the approach for local variables,
with the additional postcondition of type consistency. Both local variables and fields of nonprimitive
type, and transaction parameters must always refer to instances of appropriate contracts; the only
discrepancy permitted is of mode. Obsidian forbids re-assigning formal parameters to refer to other
objects to ensure soundness of this analysis.
Re-entrancy imposes a significant problem here: re-entrant calls from the middle of a trans-
action’s body, where the fields may not be consistent with their types, can be dangerous, since
the called transactions are supposed to be allowed to assume that the fields reference objects
consistent with the fields’ types. To address this, Obsidian distinguishes between public and pri-
vate transactions. Obsidian forbids re-entrant calls to public transactions at the object level of
granularity (i.e., a transaction cannot invoke another transaction on an object for which there is
already an invocation on the stack). The Obsidian runtime detects illegal re-entrant calls and aborts
transactions that attempt them. However, to facilitate helper transactions, Obsidian also supports
private transactions, which declare the expected types of the fields before and after the invocation.
For example:
contract AContract {
state S1;
state S2;
AContract@S1 c;
private (AContract@S2 >> S1 c) transaction t1() {. . . }
}
Transaction t1may only be invoked by transactions of AContract, only on this, and only when
this.c temporarily has type AContract@S2. When t1 is invoked, the typechecker checks to make
sure field c has type C@S2, and assumes that after t1 returns, c will have type AContract@S1. Of
course, the body of t1 is checked assuming that c has type C@S2 to make sure that afterward, c
has type C@S1.
Avoiding unsafe re-entrancy has been shown to be important for real-world smart contract
security, as millions of dollars were stolen in the DAO hack via a re-entrant call exploit [Daian
2016].
4.5 Dynamic State Checks
The Obsidian compiler enforces that transactions can only be invoked when it can prove statically
that the objects are in appropriate states according to the signature of the transaction to be invoked.
In some cases, however, it is impossible to determine this statically. For example, consider redeem
in Fig. 5. After line 24, the contract may be in either state Active or state Expired. However,
inside the dynamic state check block that starts on line 29, the compiler assumes that this is in
state Active. The compiler generates a dynamic check of state according to the test. However,
regarding the code in the block, there are two cases. If the dynamic state check is of an Owned
reference x , then it suffices for the type checker to check the block under the assumption that the
reference is of type according to the dynamic state check. However, if the reference is Shared,
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1 main asset contract GiftCertificate {
2 Date @ Unowned expirationDate;
3
4 state Active {
5 Money @ Owned balance;
6 }
7
8 state Expired;
9 state Redeemed;
10
11 GiftCertificate(Money @ Owned >> Unowned b, Date @ Unowned d)
12 {
13 expirationDate = d;
14 ->Active(balance = b);
15 }
16
17 transaction checkExpiration(GiftCertificate @ Active >> (Active | Expired) this)
18 {
19 if (getCurrentDate (). greaterThan(expirationDate )) {
20 disown balance;
21 ->Expired;
22 }
23 }
24 transaction redeem(GiftCertificate @ Active >> (Expired | Redeemed) this)
25 returns Money@Owned
26 {
27 checkExpiration ();
28
29 if (this in Active) {
30 Money result = balance;
31 ->Redeemed;
32 return result;
33 }
34 else {
35 revert "Can 't redeem expired certificate ";
36 }
37 }
38 transaction getCurrentDate(GiftCertificate @ Unowned this)
39 returns Date @ Unowned
40 {
41 return new Date ();
42 }
43 }
Fig. 5. A dynamic state check example.
there is a problem: what if code in the block changes the state of the object referenced by x? This
would violate the expectations of the code inside the block, which is checked as if it had ownership
of x . We consider the cases, since the compiler always knows whether an expression is Owned,
Unowned, or Shared:
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• If the expression to be tested is a variable with Owned mode, the body of the if statement
can be checked assuming that the variable initially references an object in the specified state,
since that code will only execute if that is the case due to the dynamic check.
• If the expression to be tested is a variable with Unownedmode, there may be another owner
(and the variable cannot be used to change the state of the referenced object anyway). In that
case, typechecking of the body of the if proceeds as if there had been no state test, since it
would be unsafe to assume that the reference is owned. However, this kind of test can be
useful if the desired behavior does not statically require that the object is in the given state.
For example, in a university accounting system, if a Student is in Enrolled state, then their
account should be debited by the cost of tuition this semester. The debit operation does not
directly depend on the student’s state; the state check is a matter of policy regarding who
gets charged tuition.
• If the expression to be tested is a variable with Shared mode, then the runtime maintains a
state lock that pertains to other shared references. The body is checked initially assuming
that the variable owns a reference to an object in the specified state. Then, the type checker
verifies that the variable still holds ownership at the end and that the variable has not been
re-assigned in the body. However, at runtime, if any other Shared reference is used to change
the state of the referenced object (for example, via another alias used in a transaction that is
invoked by the body of the dynamic state check block), then the transaction is aborted (recall
that the blockchain environment is sequential, so there is only one top-level transaction
in progress at a time). This approach enables safe code to complete but ensures that the
analysis of the type checker regarding the state of the referenced object remains sound. This
approach also bears low runtime cost, since the cost of the check is borne only in transitions
via Shared references. An alternative design would require checks at invocations to make
sure that the referenced object was indeed in the state the typechecker expected, but we
expect our approach has significantly lower runtime cost. Furthermore, our approach results
in errors occurring immediately on transition. The alternative approach would give errors
only when the referenced object was used, which could be substantially after the infringing
transition, which would require the programmer to figure out which transition caused the
bug.
• If the expression to be tested is not a variable, the body of the if statement is checked in the
same static context as the if statement itself. It would be unsafe for the compiler to make
any assumptions about the type of future executions of the expression, since the type may
change. This case only occurs in Obsidian, not in the underlying Silica formalism, which is
in A-normal form [Sabry and Felleisen 1992].
The dynamic state check mechanism is related to the focusing mechanism of Fahndrich and
DeLine [2002]. Unlike focusing, Obsidian’s dynamic state checks detect unsafe uses of aliases
precisely rather than conservatively, enabling many more safe programs to typecheck. Furthermore,
Obsidian does not require the programmer to specify guards, which in focusing enable the compiler
to reason conservatively about which references may alias.
4.6 Parametric Polymorphism
Parametric polymorphism is particularly important for Obsidian in order to maintain safety of
collections and avoid needless code duplication. Requiring users to cast objects retrieved from
containers to appropriate type would defeat the point of the language, which is to provide strong
static guarantees, since those casts would have to be checked dynamically. Furthermore, there
would have to be separate containers for different modes, since a container’s elements would need to
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be eitherUnowned, Shared, orOwned. In Obsidian, a contract can have two type parameters: one
for a contract and one for a mode. For example, part of the polymorphic LinkedList implementation
is as follows:
1 contract LinkedList[T@s] {
2 state Empty;
3 state HasNext {
4 LinkedList[T@s]@Owned next;
5 T@s value;
6 }
7 transaction append(LinkedList@Owned this , T@s >> Unowned obj) {
8 . . .
9 }
10 }
Line 1 shows that the contract type is parameterized by the contract variable T, and the mode is
parameterized by the mode variable s. In line 4, the next field is an Owned reference to an object
of type LinkedList[T@s] – that is, a node whose type parameters are the same as the containing
contract’s type parameters. An object of type LinkedList[Money@Owned] is a container that holds
a list of Money references, each of which the container owns. Using a separate parameter for the
mode allows parameterization over states, e.g. a LinkedList[LightSwitch@On] owns references
to LightSwitch objects that are each in the On state. In line 7, appending an element to a LinkedList
always takes any ownership that was given, and the parameter obj must conform to the type
specified by the type parameter T@s.
5 SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
Our current implementation of Obsidian supports Hyperledger Fabric [The Linux Foundation 2018],
a permissioned blockchain platform. In contrast to public platforms, such as Ethereum, Fabric
permits organizations to decide who has access to the ledger, and which peers need to approve
(endorse) each transaction. This typically provides higher throughput and more convenient control
over confidential data than public blockchains, allowing operators to trade off between distributed
trust and high performance. Fabric supports smart contracts implemented in Java, so the Obsidian
compiler translates Obsidian source code to Java for deployment on Fabric peer nodes. The Obsidian
compiler prepares appropriately-structured directories with Java code and a build file. Fabric builds
and executes the Java code inside purpose-build Docker containers that run on the peer nodes. The
overall Obsidian compiler architecture is shown in Fig. 6.
5.1 Storage in the ledger
Fabric provides a key/value store for persisting the state of smart contracts in the ledger. As a
result, Fabric requires that smart contracts serialize their state in terms of key/value pairs. In
other smart contract languages, programmers are required to manually write code to serialize and
deserialize their smart contract data. In contrast, Obsidian automatically generates serialization
code, leveraging protocol buffers [Google Inc. 2019] to map between message formats and sequences
of bytes. When a transaction is executed, the appropriate objects are lazily loaded from the key/value
store as required for the transaction’s execution. Lazy loading is shallow: the object’s fields are
loaded, but objects that fields reference are not loaded until their fields are needed. After executing
the transaction, Obsidian’s runtime environment automatically serializes the modified objects and
saves them in the ledger. This means that aborting a transaction and reverting any changes is
very cheap, since this entails not setting key/value pairs in the store, flushing the heap of objects
that have been lazily loaded, and (shallowly) re-loading the root object from the ledger. This lazy
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approach decreases execution cost and frees the programmer from needing to manually load and
unload key/value pairs from the ledger, as would normally be required on Fabric.
5.2 Obsidian client programs
The convention formost blockchain systems is that smart contracts are written in one language, such
as Solidity, and client programs are written in a different language, such as JavaScript. Unfortunately,
in Solidity, transaction arguments and outputs must be primitives, not objects; arrays of bytes
can be transferred, but the client and server must each implement corresponding serialization
and deserialization code. The interface for a given contract is specified in an Application Binary
Interface (ABI), documented in a schema written in JavaScript. If there are any incompatibilities
between the semantics of the JavaScript serialization code and the semantics of the Solidity contract
that interprets the serialized message, there can be bugs.
Obsidian addresses this problem by allowing users to write client programs in Obsidian. Client
programs can reference the same contract implementations that were instantiated on the server,
obviating the need for two different implementations of data structures. Clients use the same
automatically-generated serialization and deserialization code that the server does. As a result,
Obsidian permits arbitrary objects (encoded via protocol buffers) to be passed as arguments and
returned from transactions. Since the protocol buffer specifications are emitted by the Obsidian
compiler, any client (even non-Obsidian clients) can use these specifications to correctly serialize
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and deserialize native Obsidian objects in order to invoke Obsidian transactions and interpret their
results.
The Obsidian client program has a main transaction, which takes a remote reference. The
keyword remote, which modifies types of object references, indicates that the type refers to a
remote object. The compiler implements remote references with stubs, via an RMI-like mechanism.
When a non-remote reference is passed as an argument to a remote transaction, the referenced
object is serialized and sent to the blockchain. Afterward, the reference becomes a remote reference,
so that only one copy of the object exists (otherwise mutations to the referenced object on the
client would not be reflected on the blockchain, resulting in potential bugs). This change in type is
similar to how reference modes change during execution. Fig. 7 shows a simple client program that
uses the TinyVendingMachine above. The main transaction takes a remote reference to the smart
contract instance.
Every Obsidian object has a unique ID, and references to objects can be transmitted between
clients and the blockchain via object ID. There is some subtlety in the ID system in Obsidian: all
blockchain transactions must be deterministic so that all peers generate the same IDs, so it is
impossible to use traditional (e.g., timestamp-based or hardware-based) UUID generation. Instead,
Obsidian bases IDs on transaction identifiers, which Fabric provides, and on an index kept in an ID
factory. Since transaction IDs are unique, each transaction can have its own ID factory and still
avoid collisions. The initial index is reset to zero at the beginning of each transaction so that no
state pertaining to ID generation needs to be stored between transactions. Blockchains provide a
sequential execution environment, so there is no need to address race conditions in ID generation.
When clients instantiate contracts, they generate IDs with a traditional UUID algorithm, since
clients operate off the blockchain.
Although serializing objects according to their Protobuf specifications is better than requiring
programmers to manually write their own serialization code, if a client is written in a traditional
language, the client does not obtain the safety benefits of the Obsidian type system. Obsidian
addresses this problem by trackingwhich objects are owned by some client. Although the blockchain
cannot know which client owns each object or prevent non-Obsidian clients from duplicating or
losing assets that are owned by clients, the Obsidian blockchain runtime aborts transactions that
attempt to pass ownership from client to blockchain of assets that no client owns.
Blockchains allow clients to interleave their transactions arbitrarily. This does not suffice to
ensure safety in arbitrary Obsidian client programs because client programs need to rely on state
information that they obtain dynamically. The current implementation of Obsidian assumes that
Obsidian clients will not race with other clients. In the future, however, Obsidian will address this
issue in a platform-appropriate manner. Once the programmer identifies a critical section, one
approach is for the client to wrap the section in a lambda so that the server can execute it in one
transaction. This approach might work well on Ethereum, where clients must pay for the costs
of executing code on the blockchain. However, on Fabric, this approach is problematic because
the security policy is such that clients should not force the blockchain to execute arbitrary code
(for example, including non-terminating code). An approach that may be more effective is to use
optimistic concurrency [Kung and Robinson 1981], in which smart contracts on the blockchain
defer commitment of changes from clients until the client’s critical section is done; then, either
the transaction is committed, or the changes are discarded because of intervening changes that
occurred.
5.3 Ensuring safety with untrusted clients
If a client program is written in a language other than Obsidian, it may not adhere to Obsidian’s
type system. For example, a client program may obtain an owned reference to an object and then
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1 import "TinyVendingMachine.obs"
2
3 main contract TinyVendingMachineClient {
4 transaction main(remote TinyVendingMachine@Shared machine) {
5 restock(machine );
6
7 if (machine in Full) {
8 Coin c = new Coin ();
9 remote Candy candy = machine.buy(c);
10 eat(candy);
11 }
12 }
13
14 private transaction restock(remote TinyVendingMachine@Shared machine) {
15 if (machine in Empty) {
16 Candy candy = new Candy ();
17 machine.restock(candy);
18 }
19 }
20
21 private transaction eat(remote Candy @ Owned >> Unowned c) {
22 disown c;
23 }
24 }
Fig. 7. A simple client program, showing how clients reference a smart contract on the blockchain. Note
that the blockchain-side smart contract has been modified (relative to Fig. 1) to have Shared receivers, since
top-level objects are never owned by clients.
attempt to transfer ownership of that object to multiple references on the blockchain. This is called
the double-spend problem on blockchains: a program may attempt to consume a resource more than
once. To address this problem, the Obsidian runtime keeps a list of all objects for which ownership
has been passed outside the blockchain. When a transaction is invoked on an argument that must
be owned, the runtime aborts the transaction if that object is not owned outside the blockchain,
and otherwise removes the object from the list. Likewise, when a transaction argument or result
becomes owned by the client after the transaction (according to the transaction’s signature), the
runtime adds the object to the list. Of course, Obsidian has no way of ensuring safe manipulation
of owned references in non-Obsidian clients, but this approach ensures that each time an owned
reference leaves the blockchain, it only returns once, preventing double-spending attacks. Obsidian
cannot ensure that non-Obsidian clients do not lose their owned references, so we hope that most
client code that manipulates assets will be written in Obsidian.
6 SILICA
In this section, we describe Silica, the core calculus that forms a foundation for Obsidian. Silica is so
named because silica comprises 70% or more of obsidian glass [Wikipedia contributors 2019]. Silica
is designed in the style of Featherweight Typestate [Garcia et al. 2014], which is itself designed in
the style of Featherweight Java [Igarashi et al. 2001]. Since Obsidian is a more traditional object-
oriented, imperative language, the syntax, type checker, etc. implemented in the system differs
slightly from the rules for Silica.
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Silica uses A-normal form [Sabry and Felleisen 1992] as a simplification to avoid nested expres-
sions in most cases. The production s in the grammar stands for a reference to an object, which can
then be used to build other expressions. In our initial explanation, s ranges over variables, but in
§6.3 we will introduce locations, which facilitate our proof of correctness.
Silica differs significantly from Featherweight Typestate (FT). Silica avoids class-level inheritance
to simplify reasoning about programs. In order to formalize expression of (a) fields that are common
to more than one state; and (b) a type system that is aware of all possible (nominal) states of a
particular object, Silica defines a notion of state in addition to a notion of contract. FT only has
a notion of class and expects the programmer to simulate states by specifying multiple classes
that interoperate. Unlike FT, Silica permits the typestate of a field to differ temporarily from its
declaration, as long as consistency is restored and not visible outside the contract. This facilitates
patterns of use we saw our participants use in user studies.
Silica fuses the notions of typestate and permission into one type construct, unlike FT, which has
separate notions of permission and state guarantee. With this approach, the syntax of Silica exactly
expresses the set of possible reference types. Silica also distinguishes between asset contracts and
non-asset contracts; owning references to asset contracts are treated linearly rather than in an
affine way. FT has no way of treating references linearly.
Silica supports parametric polymorphism, a key feature requested by our industrial stakeholders.
Although this makes the language more complex, we think this complexity is outweighed by the
benefit of the feature, enabling (for example) reusable containers.
As a result, although some aspects of the system are more complex than FT, Silica is more
expressive in the above respects. Silica serves as a sound foundation for Obsidian but could be used
or adapted for other typestate-oriented languages.
Fig. 8 shows the syntax of Silica.
6.1 Silica Static Semantics
Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′ Well-typed expressions
Unlike some traditional typing judgments, in addition to an input typing context ∆, Silica’s
typing judgment includes an output typing context ∆′. This is because an expression can change
the mode of object references. For example, using a variable that references an object may consume
ownership of the object.
Note that e ∶ T is defined to mean a sequence e ∶ T . Expressions are typechecked in the context
of an indirect reference l or variable x , which represents this . Initial programs are written using
this , but evaluation of invocations will substitute locations for instances of this . The subscript on
the turnstile tracks the value of this in the current invocation.
T-lookup relies on the split judgment (T1 ⇛ T2/T3), which describes how a permission in T1 can
be split between T2 and T3.
T1 ⇛ T2/T3
Γ;∆, s ′ ∶ T1 ⊢s s
′ ∶ T2 ⊣ ∆, s
′ ∶ T3
T-lookup
In let, the bound variable can be an owning reference to an asset, but if so, e2 must consume the
ownership (as indicated by disposable).
Γ;∆ ⊢s e1 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′
Γ;∆′,x ∶ T1 ⊢s e2 ∶ T2 ⊣ ∆
′′
,x ∶ T ′1 Γ ⊢ disposable (T ′1)
Γ;∆ ⊢s let x ∶ T1 = e1 in e2 ∶ T2 ⊣ ∆
′′ T-let
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C ∈ ContractNames m ∈ transactionNames
I ∈ InterfaceNames S ∈ StateNames
D ∈ ContractNames ∪ InterfaceNames p ∈ PermissionVariables
X ∈ DeclarationVariables f ∈ FieldNames
x ∈ IdentifierNames
T F TC.TST (types of contract references)
TC F D⟨T ⟩ (types of concrete contracts/interfaces)∣ X (declaration variables)
TST F S (nonempty disjunction of states)∣ p (permission/state variables)∣ P
P F Owned ∣ Unowned ∣ Shared
TG F [asset] X.p◁ I⟨T ⟩.TST (generic type parameter)
CON F contract C⟨TG⟩◁ I⟨T ⟩ { ST M }
IFACE F interface I⟨TG⟩ { ST MSIG }
ST F [asset] S F
F F T f
MSIG F Tm⟨TG⟩ (T ⟫TST x) TST ⟫ TST (arguments cannot change class)∣ TST ⟫TST f Tm⟨TG⟩(T ⟫TST x) TST ⟫ TST (fields have pre- and post-specifications)
M F MSIG e
e F s∣ s.f (field access)∣ s.m⟨T ⟩(x)∣ let x ∶ T = e in e∣ new C⟨T ⟩.S(s) (contract fields; state fields)∣ s↗Owned∣Shared S(s) (State transition)∣ s.f := s (field update, with 1-based indexing)∣ assert s in T ST (static assert)∣ if s inP T ST then e else e (dynamic state test, owned or shared s)∣ disown s (drop ownership of an owned reference)∣ pack
s F x (simple expressions)
Fig. 8. Syntax of Silica
The subsOk judgment, which is used in T-new, ensures that the given type parameters are
suitable according to the declaration of C .
Γ;∆ ⊢s s ′ ∶ Ts ′ ⊣ ∆
′
Γ ⊢ Ts ′ <∶ stateFields(C⟨T ⟩, S) subsOkΓ (T ,TG)
de f (C) = contract C⟨TG⟩ ◁ I⟨TI ⟩ {. . .}
Γ;∆ ⊢s new C⟨T ⟩.S(s ′) ∶ C⟨T ⟩.S ⊣ ∆′ T-new
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When accessing a field of this (note that the s in the expression is identical to the s subscript
in the judgement), there are two cases. In the first case, the type of the field is consistent with
the declared type of the field, in which case we make sure that the field is in scope in all possible
current states of the referenced object (via intersectFields). In the second case, the field type has
been updated due to an assignment, so the field type comes from an override in the context. In
both cases, any ownership that was present is consumed from the field.
s . f ∉ Dom(∆) T1 f ∈ intersectFields(T ) T1 ⇛ T2/T3
Γ;∆, s ∶ T ⊢s s . f ∶ T2 ⊣ ∆, s ∶ T , s . f ∶ T3
T-this-field-def
T1 ⇛ T2/T3
Γ;∆, s ∶ T , s . f ∶ T1 ⊢s s . f ∶ T2 ⊣ ∆, s ∶ T , s . f ∶ T3
T-this-field-ctxt
A field can be overwritten only if the current reference is disposable, since otherwise assignment
might overwrite owning references to assets.
Γ;∆ ⊢s s . f ∶ TC .TST ⊣ ∆
′
Γ;∆′ ⊢s sf ∶ TC .T
′
ST ⊣ ∆
′′
Γ ⊢ disposable (TC .TST )
Γ;∆ ⊢s s . f ∶= sf ∶ unit ⊣ ∆
′′
, s . f ∶ TC .T
′
ST
T-fieldUpdate
In invocations (of both public and private transactions), if the type of an argument differs from
the declared type of the formal parameter, the final type of the argument may differ from the
declared final type of the parameter. The function funcArg defines the resulting final types of the
arguments. The subtyping antecedents ensure that the arguments are suitable for the declared
types of the formal parameters. Invocations of public transactions can only occur when field types
are consistent with their declarations.
transactionΓ (m⟨TM⟩,D⟨T ⟩) = T m⟨T ′M⟩(TCx .Tx ⟫TxST x) Tthis ⟫ T ′thise
Γ ⊢ bound (TC .T ′ST s1) = D⟨T ⟩.TST s1 Γ ⊢ TST s1 <∶∗ Tthis
Γ ⊢ Ts2 <∶ TCx .Tx ∀f , s . f ∉ ∆
T
′
s1 = funcArg (TC .TST s1,TC .Tthis ,TC .T ′this) T ′s2 = funcArg (Ts2,Tx ,TCx .TxST )
Γ;∆, s1 ∶ TC .T
′
ST s1, s2 ∶ Ts2 ⊢s s1.m⟨TM⟩(s2) ∶ T ⊣ ∆, s1 ∶ T ′s1, s2 ∶ T ′s2 T-inv
Private invocations differ from public invocations because the current types of the fields must be
checked against the transaction’s preconditions and the field types must be updated after invocation.
transactionΓ (m⟨TM⟩,D⟨T ⟩) = TCf .Tf decl ⟫Tf ST x T m(TCx .Tx ⟫TxST x) Tthis ⟫ T ′this e
Γ ⊢ bound (TC .T ′ST s1) = D⟨T ⟩.TST s1 Γ ⊢ TST s1 <∶∗ Tthis
Γ ⊢ Ts2 <∶ TCx .Tx Γ ⊢ Tf <∶ TCf .Tf decl
T
′
s1 = funcArg (C .TST s1,C .Tthis ,C .T ′this) T ′s2 = funcArg (Ts2,Tx ,TCx .TxST )
T ′f = funcArg (Tf ,TCf .Tf decl ,TCf .Tf ST )
Γ;∆, s1 ∶ TC .TST s1, s2 ∶ Ts2, s . f ∶ Tf ⊢s1 s1.m⟨TM⟩(s2) ∶ T ⊣ ∆, s1 ∶ T ′s1, s2 ∶ T ′s2, s . f ∶ T ′f T-privInv
T− ↗p allows changing the nominal state of this. Unlike transitions in FT, T− ↗p does not
permit arbitrary changes of class; it restricts the change to states within the object’s current contract.
It requires giving away ownership of all possible fields of this first. Since the current state may
not be uniquely known statically, unionFields is used to identify all possible current fields.
1:22 Coblenz et al.
Obsidian permits assignment to fields in target states before the transition has occurred. This is
not directly supported in Silica, but can be represented indirectly.
Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ p p ∈ {Shared,Owned}
Γ;∆ ⊢s x ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′
Γ ⊢ T <∶ type(stateFields(C⟨TA⟩, S ′))
unionFields(C⟨TA⟩,TST ) = Tf s fs f ieldTypess(∆;Tf s fs) = T ′f s Γ ⊢ disposable (T ′f s)
Γ;∆, s ∶ C⟨TA⟩.TST ⊢s s ↗p S ′(x) ∶ unit ⊣ ∆′, s ∶ C⟨TA⟩.S ′ T-↗p
S ⊆ S ′
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .S ⊢s assert x in S ′ ∶ unit ⊣ ∆,x ∶ TC .S
T-assertStates
TST ∈ {Owned,Unowned, Shared}
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .TST ⊢s assert x in TST ∶ unit ⊣ ∆,x ∶ TC .TST
T-assertPermission
When asserting that a variable is in a state corresponding to a type variable, bound∗ is used to
compute the most specific concrete mode for the variable.
nonVar (TST ) Γ ⊢ bound∗ (p) = TST
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .TST ⊢s assert x in TST ∶ unit ⊣ ∆,x ∶ TC .TST
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .TST ⊢s assert x in p ∶ unit ⊣ ∆,x ∶ TC .TST
T-assertInVar
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .p ⊢s assert x in p ∶ unit ⊣ ∆,x ∶ TC .p
T-assertInVarAlready
Dynamic state tests are typechecked according to the ownership of the variable to be checked.
T-isInStaticOwnership can be used when a variable is an owning reference but does not provide a
particular state specification that the programmer wants. In contrast, IsIn-Dynamic applies when
there is no ownership.
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .S ⊢s e1 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′
S ⊆ states(TC)
Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ Owned Sx = possibleStatesΓ (TC .TST )
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .(Sx \ S) ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆′′ ∆f =merдe(∆′,∆′′)
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .TST ⊢s if x inowned S then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆f
T-IsInStaticOwnership
In if x inshared S then e1 else e2, e1 is permitted to change the state of the object referenced by
x , but it is not permitted to allow another reference to obtain permanent ownership of the object.
While e1 is evaluating, all state changes to the object referenced by x that occur via Shared aliases
will cause program termination, so it is up to the programmer to ensure that this is impossible.
S ⊆ states(TC) Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .S ⊢s e1 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆′,x ∶ TC .T ′ST
Γ ⊢ bound∗ (T ′ST ) ≠ Unowned
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .Shared ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′′
,x ∶ TC .Shared
∆f =merдe(∆′,∆′′),x ∶ TC .Shared
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .Shared ⊢s if x inshared S then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆f
T-IsIn-Dynamic
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If the test is against a permission variable, we check e1 in a context that gives x the permission
variable’s permission, which will result in relying on the bound on p in Γ.
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .p ⊢s e1 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .TST ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′′
∆f =merдe(∆′,∆′′) Perm = ToPermission (TST )
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .TST ⊢s if x inPerm p then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆f
T-IsIn-PermVar
In T-IsIn-Perm-Then and T-IsIn-Perm-Else, the compiler knows which branch will be taken:
either TST satisfies the given condition or it does not. If TST is a variable, then we treat it as if it
were owned (via ToPermission).
Perm ∈ {Owned,Unowned, Shared} P = ToPermission (TST )
Γ ⊢ P <∶∗ Perm Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .TST ⊢s e1 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .TST ⊢s if x inP Perm then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′ T-IsIn-Perm-Then
Perm ∈ {Owned,Unowned, Shared} P = ToPermission (TST )
Γ ⊢ P /<∶∗ Perm Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .TST ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆′
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .TST ⊢s if x inP Perm then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′ T-IsIn-Perm-Else
The case where we test to see if an unowned reference is in a particular state is included because
it can arise via substitution.
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .Unowned ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′
Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .Unowned ⊢s if x inUnowned S then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′ T-IsIn-Unowned
Disown discards ownership of its parameter. Existing ownership is split; in TC .TST ⇛ T/T ′, T
retains ownership and T ′ lacks it, so the output context uses T ′ as the new type of s ′. Note that the
split is not a function; one can see by inspection of the definition of split that T ′ is not owned, but
may be either shared or unowned.
TC .TST ⇛ T/T ′ Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ Owned
Γ;∆, s ′ ∶ TC .TST ⊢s disown s
′ ∶ unit ⊣ ∆, s ′ ∶ T ′
T-disown
Pack updates ∆, removing all type overrides of fields of this. It is only appropriate, of course,
when the existing overrides are consistent with the field declarations. There is no corresponding
unpack; instead, field assignment and field reading can cause a future need to invoke pack. Note
that pack exists only in the formal model and is not needed in user programs because the compiler
can insert them where required (at the ends of transactions and before invocations of public
transactions).
s . f ∉ dom(∆) contractFields(T ) = Tdecl f Γ ⊢ Tf <∶ Tdecl Γ ⊢ Tf ≈ Tdecl
Γ;∆, s ∶ T , s . f ∶ Tf ⊢s pack ∶ unit ⊣ ∆, s ∶ T
T-pack
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M ok in C Well-typed transaction
params(C) = TG Var(TG) = T Γ = TG ,TM
Γ; this ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Tthis , x ∶ Cx .Tx ⊢this e ∶ T ⊣ this ∶ C .T ′this ,x ∶ Cx .T ′x
T m⟨TM⟩(Cx .Tx ⟫T ′x x) Tthis ⟫ T ′this e ok in C PublicTransactionOK
Note that all fields of thismust end the transaction with types consistent with their declarations;
otherwise, there would be occurrences of s.f in ∆′.
params(C) = TG Var(TG) = T contractFields(C⟨T ⟩) = Tf f
∆ = s ∶ C⟨T ⟩.TST , s . f ∶ contract(Tf ).Sf 1,x ∶ Cx .Tx
∆
′ = s ∶ C⟨T ⟩.T ′ST , s . f ∶ contract(Tf ).Sf 2,x ∶ Cx .T ′x
Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′
Γ = TG ,TM
Sf 1 >> Sf 2 f T m⟨TM⟩(Cx .Tx ⟫T ′xx)TST ⟫ T ′ST e ok in C PrivateTransactionOK
The difference between public and private transactions is that private transactions may begin and
end with fields inconsistent with their declarations. In both cases, inside e , it is possible to set fields
of this so that they do not match their declared types. However, while this is the case, additional
public transactions cannot be invoked, ensuring that only private transactions are exposed to the
inconsistent state.
There may be aliases to this. However, if the fields of this are inconsistent with their types, no
public transactions can be invoked, so the inconsistency cannot be visible outside this transaction
and any private transactions that it invokes. Furthermore, the state of this can only be changed if
the permission on this allows that operation (see This-state-transition).
In Obsidian, field pre- and post- types are optional; when they are omitted, specifications match
the field type declarations.
ST ok Well-formed State
All fields must have distinct names, and if any field is an asset, then the state must be labeled
asset.
∀i, j i ≠ j ⇒ fi ≠ fj Γ ⊢ nonAsset (T )
Γ ⊢ S T f ok
∀i, j i ≠ j ⇒ fi ≠ fj
Γ ⊢ asset S T f ok
CL ok Well-typed Contract
M ok in C TG ⊢ ST ok ∣ST ∣ > 0
transactionNames (I) ⊆ transactionNames (C) stateNames (I) ⊆ stateNames (C)
∀T ∈ T , isVar (T ) ⟹ T ∈ Var(TG)
∀M ∈ M, transactionName (M) ∈ transactionNames (I) ⟹ implementOkTG (I⟨T ⟩,M)
∀S ∈ ST , stateName (S) ∈ stateNames (I) ⟹ implementOkTG (I⟨T ⟩, S)
genericsOkTG (TG) subsOkTG (T , params (I))
contract C⟨TG⟩ ◁ I⟨T ⟩ {ST F M} ok
IFACE ok Well-typed Interface
Obsidian 1:25
genericsOkTG (TG)
interface I⟨TG⟩{ST MSIG} ok
PG ok Well-typed Program
CON ok IFACE ok ⋅; ⋅ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ⋅⟨IFACE,CON , e⟩ ok
6.2 Auxiliary Judgements
6.2.1 Program structure.
We assume that the contracts and interfaces defined in a program are ambiently available via
the de f function, which retrieves the definition of a contract or interface (definition) by name.
Likewise, the definition of a state S of contract or interface D can be retrieved via sde f (D, S), and
the definition of a transaction can be retrieved via tde f (D,m). Note that for declaration variables
de f (X) is the interface bound on X ; similarly, sde f (X , S) is the state in the bound on X . That is
sde f (X , S) = sde f (de f (X), S).
stateFields(D, S)
On individual states, stateFields gives only the fields defined directly in those states:
de f (C) = contract C⟨TG⟩ ◁ I⟨T ⟩ {ST M}
S F ∈ ST
stateFields(C, S) = F stateFields(I , S) = ⋅
unionFields(T )
The unionFields function looks up the fields that are defined in ANY of the states in a set of
states. Note that the syntax guarantees that any field has consistent types in all states in which it is
defined. This is useful when it is known that one of two different types captures the state of an
object, but it is not known which one.
F = ∪S∈SstateFields(D, S)
unionFields(D.S) = F
TST ∈ {Shared,Owned,Unowned}
cde f (C) = contract C{[asset]S FS M}
F = ∪S∈FS stateFields(C, S)
unionFields(D.TST ) = F
intersectFields(T )
The intersectFields function looks up the fields that are defined in ALL of the states in a set of
states. Note that the syntax guarantees that any field has consistent types in all states in which it is
defined.
F = ∩S∈SstateFields(D, S)
intersectFields(D.S) = F
TST ∈ {Shared,Owned,Unowned}
cde f (C) = contract C{[asset]S FS M}
F = ∩S∈FS stateFields(D, S)
intersectFields(C .TST ) = F
contract(TC )
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The contract function relates types with their contracts.
contract(TC .TST ) = TC
contractFields(C)
On contracts, contractFields gives the set of field declarations defined in all of a contract’s states.
contractFields(C) ≜ intersectFields(C .Unowned)
f ieldTypess(∆;Tf s fs)
f ieldTypes gives the current types of the fields, given that some of them may be overridden in
the current context.
f ieldTypess(⋅;Tf s fs) = Tf s f ∈ fs f ieldTypess(∆;Tf s fs) = T
′
f ieldTypess(∆, s . f ∶ T ;Tf s fs) = T ,T ′
f ieldTypess(∆,b ∶ T ;Tf s fs) = f ieldTypess(∆;Tf s fs)
6.2.2 Reasoning about types.
ToPermission (TST )
ToPermission provides a conservative approximation of ownership to ensure that if ToPermission
indicates non-ownership, the type is definitely disposable.
ToPermission (S) ≜ Owned ToPermission (Unowned) ≜ Unowned
ToPermission (p) ≜ Owned ToPermission (Shared) ≜ Shared
ToPermission (Owned) ≜ Owned
possibleStatesΓ (TC .TST ) = TST
possibleStatesΓ (TC .S) = S P ∈ {Owned, Shared,Unowned}possibleStatesΓ (TC .P) = stateNames (de f (TC))[asset] X .p ◁ I⟨T ⟩.TST ∈ Γ
possibleStatesΓ (TC .p) = possibleStatesΓ (TC .TST )
Γ ⊢ isAsset (T)
asset S F ∈ possibleStatesΓ (D⟨T ⟩.TST )
Γ ⊢ isAsset (D⟨T ⟩.TST ) asset X .p ◁ I⟨T ⟩.TSTi ∈ ΓΓ ⊢ isAsset (X .TST )
Γ ⊢ nonAssetState (ST)
Γ ⊢ nonAssetState (S F)
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Γ ⊢ nonAsset (T)
Γ ⊢ nonAssetState (possibleStatesΓ (D⟨T ⟩.TST ))
Γ ⊢ nonAsset (D⟨T ⟩.TST ) X .p ◁ I⟨T ⟩.TSTi ∈ ΓΓ ⊢ nonAsset (X .TST )
Γ ⊢ disposable (T)
The disposable judgement describes reference types that are NOT owning references to assets.
When applied to a set of states, all states must be disposable in order for the set to be disposable.
notOwned (T )
Γ ⊢ disposable (TC .TST ) maybeOwned (TC .TST ) Γ ⊢ nonAsset (TC .TST )Γ ⊢ disposable (TC .TST )
notOwned (T)
notOwned (TC .Unowned) notOwned (TC .Shared) notOwned (unit)
maybeOwned (T)
TST <∶∗ Owned
maybeOwned (TC .TST ) maybeOwned (TC .p)
Note that all permission variables could be owned, because we only have upper bounds on
permissions. Therefore, we must treat all permission variables as though they may be owned.
Γ ⊢ bound (T )
Γ ⊢ bound (unit) = unit Γ ⊢ bound∗ (TST ) = T
′
ST
Γ ⊢ bound (D⟨T ⟩.TST ) = D⟨T ⟩.T ′ST
[asset] X .p ◁ I⟨T ⟩.T ′ST ∈ Γ Γ ⊢ bound∗ (TST ) = T ′ST
Γ ⊢ bound (X .TST ) = I⟨T ⟩.T ′ST
Γ ⊢ bound∗ (TST )
P ∈ {Owned, Shared,Unowned}
Γ ⊢ bound∗ (P) = P Γ ⊢ bound∗ (S) = S [asset] X .p ◁ I⟨T ⟩.TST ∈ ΓΓ ⊢ bound∗ (p) = TST
The bound of a type T or permission or state TST is the most specific concrete (i.e., non-variable)
type (resp. permission or state) that is a supertype of T . For example, if we know from a type
parameter that the type variableX must implement an interface I⟨T ⟩ and p must be a subpermission
of Owned, then the bound of X .p is I⟨T ⟩.Owned. However, a concrete type such as C⟨T ⟩.S is
already as specific as possible—therefore, its bound is itself.
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nonVar (T ), nonVar (TC), nonVar (TST )
nonVar (D⟨T ⟩.TST ) nonVar (unit) nonVar (D⟨T ⟩)
TST ∈ {Owned, Shared,Unowned}
nonVar (TST ) nonVar (S)
isVar (T ), isVar (TC), isVar (TST )
isVar (X .TST ) isVar (X) isVar (p)
Var(TG), PermVar(TG), Perm(T )
Var([asset] X .p ◁ I⟨T ⟩.TST ) ≜ X
PermVar([asset] X .p ◁ I⟨T ⟩.TST ) ≜ p
Perm(TC .TST ) ≜ TST
Perm(unit) ≜ Unowned
transactionName (M), transactionName (MSIG), transactionNames (M)
transactionName (Tm⟨TM⟩(T ⟫TSTx)TST ⟫ TST ) ≜m
transactionName (Tm⟨TM⟩(T ⟫TSTx)TST ⟫ TST e) ≜m
transactionName (TST >> TST f Tm⟨TM⟩(T ⟫TSTx)TST ⟫ TST ) ≜m
transactionName (TST >> TST f Tm⟨TM⟩(T ⟫TSTx)TST ⟫ TST e) ≜m
transactionNames (M) ≜ transactionName (M)
states (D)
contract C⟨TG⟩ ◁ I⟨T ⟩{ST M}
states (C) = ST interface I⟨TG⟩{ST MSIG}states (I) = ST
stateNames (D), stateName (S)
stateName ([asset] S F) = S states (D) = SstateNames (D) = stateName (S)
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params (D), params (M)
de f (C) = contract C⟨TG⟩ ◁ I⟨T ⟩{ST M}
params (C) = TG de f (I) = interface I⟨TG⟩{ST MSIG}params (I) = TG
params (T m⟨TM⟩(T ⟫TST x) TSTi ⟫ TSTf e) = TM
params (TST s1 >> TST s2 f T m⟨TM⟩(T ⟫TST x) TSTi ⟫ TSTf e) = TM
implementOkΓ (I⟨T ⟩,MSIG), implementOkΓ (I⟨T ⟩, ST)
transactionΓ (m, I⟨T ⟩) = T ′r et m⟨T ′M⟩(T ′ ⟫T ′ST x) T ′STi ⟫ T ′STf
Γ ⊢ T ′ <∶ T Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ T ′ST Γ ⊢ T
′
STi <∶∗ TSTi
Γ ⊢ TSTf <∶∗ T
′
STf Γ ⊢ Tr et <∶ T
′
r et
implementOkΓ (I⟨T ⟩,Tr et m⟨TM⟩(T ⟫TST x) TSTi ⟫ TSTf )
sde f (S, I⟨T ⟩) = asset S
implementOkΓ (I⟨T ⟩, [asset] S F) sde f (S, I⟨T ⟩) = SimplementOkΓ (I⟨T ⟩, S F)
To check implementOkΓ (I⟨T ⟩, S), we only need to ensure that if our state is an asset, then the
state we are implementing is also an asset.
subsOkΓ (T ,TG)
Γ ⊢ D⟨T1⟩.TST <∶ I⟨T2⟩.T ′ST
subsOkΓ (D⟨T1⟩.TST , asset X .p ◁ I⟨T2⟩.T ′ST )
Γ ⊢ D⟨T1⟩.TST <∶ I⟨T2⟩.T ′ST Γ ⊢ nonAsset (D⟨T1⟩.Owned)
subsOkΓ (D⟨T1⟩.TST , X .p ◁ I⟨T2⟩.T ′ST )
We can substitute a non-asset for an asset generic parameter, but not vice versa. Note that, as
we can use type variables without their corresponding permission variable (e.g., we can write
X .Owned , not just X .p), we must check whether the generic parameter is an asset in any state, not
just its bound. Similarly, we must check if the type we pass is an asset in any state, not just the one
we pass.
genericsOkΓ (TG)
genericsOkΓ (TG) expresses whether a use of a type parameter is suitable when the parameter
must implement a particular interface.
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∀T ∈ T , isVar (T ) ⟹ T ∈ Var(Γ) subsOkΓ (T , params (I)) Γ ⊢ nonAsset (I⟨T ⟩.Owned)
∀TG ∈ Γ, (Var(TG) = X or PermVar(TG) = p) ⟹ TG = X .p ◁ I⟨T ⟩.TST
TST = S ⟹ ∀S ∈ S, S ∈ stateNames (I)
genericsOkΓ ( X .p ◁ I⟨T ⟩.TST )
∀T ∈ T , isVar (T ) ⟹ T ∈ Var(Γ) subsOkΓ (T , params (I))
∀TG ∈ Γ, (Var(TG) = X or PermVar(TG) = p) ⟹ TG = X .p ◁ I⟨T ⟩.TST
TST = S ⟹ ∀S ∈ S, S ∈ stateNames (I)
genericsOkΓ (asset X .p ◁ I⟨T ⟩.TST )
σ (T/TG) (e)
TG = [asset] X .p ◁ I⟨T2⟩.T ′ST
σ (D⟨T ⟩.TST /TG) (e) = [D⟨T ⟩/X][TST /p]e
T = T1,T2, . . . ,Tn TG = TG1 ,TG2 , . . . ,TGn
σ (T/TG) (e) = (σ (Tn/TGn ) ◦ σ (Tn−1/TGn−1) ◦⋯ ◦ σ (T1/TG1)) (e)
transactionΓ (m⟨TM⟩,D⟨T ⟩))
tde f (D,m) = M TM = params (M) TG = params (D)
subsOkΓ (T ,TG) subsOkΓ (T2,TM)
transactionΓ (m⟨T2⟩,D⟨T ⟩) = σ (T2/TM) (σ (T/TG) (M))
merge(∆,∆′) = ∆′′ The merge function computes a new context from contexts that resulted
from branching. It ensures that ownership is consistent across both branches and takes the union
of state sets for each variable.
For brevity, let d F x ∣ x . f .
merдe(∆;∆′) = ∆′′
merдe(∆′;∆) = ∆′′ Sym merдe(∆;∆′) = ∆′′merдe(∆,d ∶ T ;∆′,d ∶ T ′) = ∆′′,d ∶ (T ⊕T ′) ⊕
x ∉ Dom(∆′) merдe(∆,∆′) = ∆′′ Γ ⊢ disposable (T )
merдe(∆,x ∶ T ;∆′) = ∆′′ Dispose-disposable
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T ⊕T ≜ T
TC .Owned ⊕TC .S ≜ TC .Owned
TC .Shared ⊕TC .Unowned ≜ TC .Unowned
TC .S ⊕TC .S ′ ≜ TC .(S ∪ S ′)
C⟨T ⟩.TST ⊕ I⟨T ⟩.T ′ST ≜ I⟨T ⟩.(TST ⊕T ′ST ) if de f (C) = contract C⟨TG⟩ ◁ I⟨T ⟩{. . .}
D⟨T ⟩.TST ⊕ D⟨T ⟩.T ′ST ≜ D⟨T ⟩.(TST ⊕T ′ST )
funcArg (TC .TSTpassed ,TC .TST input−decl ,TC .TSToutput−decl)
This function specifies the output permission for a function argument that started with a par-
ticular permission and was passed to a formal parameter with given initial and final permission
specifications. The function is only defined for inputs that correspond with well-typed invocations.
maybeOwned (TC .TSTpassed)
funcArg (TC .TSTpassed ,TC .Unowned,TC .TSToutput−decl) = TC .TSTpassed funcArg-owned-unowned
funcArg (TC .Shared,TC .Unowned,TC .TSToutput−decl) = TC .TShared funcArg-shared-unowned
TC .TST input−decl ≠ Unowned
funcArg (TC .TSTpassed ,TC .TST input−decl ,TC .TSToutput−decl) = TC .TSToutput−decl funcArg-other
funcArgResidual (TC .TSTpassed ,TC .TST input−decl ,TC .TSToutput−decl)
This function specifies the type of the reference that remains after an argument is passed to a
function.
maybeOwned (TC .TSTpassed)
funcArgResidual (TC .TSTpassed ,TC .Unowned,TC .TSToutput−decl) = TC .TSTpassed FAR-OU
funcArgResidual (TC .Shared,TC .Unowned,TC .TSToutput−decl) = TC .TShared FAR-SU
TC .TST input−decl ≠ Unowned
funcArgResidual (TC .TSTpassed ,TC .TST input−decl ,TC .TSToutput−decl) = TC .Unowned FAR-*
Typing contexts ∆ and type bound contexts Γ
The typing context includes both local variables and temporary field types. It is assumed that ∆
and Γ are permuted as needed in order to apply the rules, but when a context is extended with a
mapping, the new mapping replaces any previous mapping of the same variable. Γ is simply a set
of generic type variables TG as defined in the grammar in Figure 8.
1:32 Coblenz et al.
Γ F ⋅∣ Γ, TG
∆ F ⋅∣ ∆, x : T∣ ∆, s.f : T
Γ ⊢ T1 <∶ T2 Subtyping
Γ ⊢ unit <∶ unit
<:-Unit
Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ T
′
ST
Γ ⊢ TC .TST <∶ TC .T
′
ST
<:-Matching-defs
Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ T
′
ST
Γ ⊢ D⟨T ⟩.TST <∶ D⟨T ⟩.T ′ST <:-Matching-decls
Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ T
′
ST
de f (C) = contract C⟨TG⟩ ◁ I⟨T ′⟩{. . .}
Γ ⊢ C⟨T ⟩.TST <∶ σ (T/TG) (I⟨T ′⟩.T ′ST ) <:-Implements-interface
Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ T
′
ST Γ ⊢ bound (X .TST ) = TC .T ′ST
Γ ⊢ X .TST <∶ TC .T
′
ST
<:-Bound
Γ ⊢ TST 1 <∶∗ TST 2 Subpermissions
The subpermission judgment is ancillary to the subtyping judgment, and specifies when an
expression with one mode can be used where one with the same contract but a potentially different
mode is expected.
Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ TST
<∶∗-Refl
Γ ⊢ TST1 <∶∗ TST2 Γ ⊢ TST2 <∶∗ TST3
Γ ⊢ TST1 <∶ TST3
<∶∗-Trans
Γ ⊢ bound∗ (p) = TST
Γ ⊢ p <∶∗ TST
<∶∗-Var
S ⊆ S ′
Γ ⊢ S <∶∗ S ′
<∶∗-S-S’
S <∶∗ Owned
<∶∗-S-O
TST 2 ≠ S
Γ ⊢ Owned <∶∗ TST 2
<∶∗-O-*
Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ Unowned
<∶∗-U-U
Γ ⊢ TST /<∶∗ TST
Γ ⊢ TST2 <∶∗ TST1 TST2 ≠ TST1
Γ ⊢ TST1 /<∶∗ TST2
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T1 ≈ T2 Ownership equality
T1 ≈ T1
≈-Refl
T1 ≈ T2
T2 ≈ T1
≈-Sym
T1 ≈ T2 T2 ≈ T3
T1 ≈ T3
≈-Trans
maybeOwned (T1) maybeOwned (T2)
T1 ≈ T2
≈-O-O
notOwned (T1) notOwned (T2)
T1 ≈ T2
≈-U-U
T1 ⇛ T2/T3 Type splitting
Type splitting specifies how ownership of objects can be shared among aliases. In T1 ⇛ T2/T3,
there is initially one reference of type T1; afterward, there are two references of type T2 and T3.
TC = contract(T )
T ⇛ T/TC .Unowned Split-Unowned TC .Shared ⇛ TC .Shared/TC .Shared Split-shared
Γ ⊢ nonAsset (TC .TST ) maybeOwned (TC .TST )
TC .TST ⇛ TC .Shared/TC .Shared Split-owned-shared
unit⇛ unit/unit Split-unit
S ok Well-formed state sequence
Well-formed states cannot have conflicts regarding ownership, and if any states are specified, then
Owned would be redundant. There must be no duplicates in the list.
S statename-list
S ok
S statename-list Well-formed statename sequence
S statename-list
S statename-list S ′ ∉ S
S, S
′ statename-list
T ok Well-formed type
S ok
TC .S ok TC .p ok unit ok
6.3 Silica Dynamic Semantics
In order to express the dynamic semantics, we must first slightly extend the syntax. We introduce a
notion of locations l , which are used only in the formal semantics, not in the implementation, as a
tool to prove soundness. Locations, introduced in FT [Garcia et al. 2014], allow the formal model to
track permissions of individual aliases to shared objects. Intuitively, locations typically correspond
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with local variables that reference objects; we record the permission each indirect reference holds
in a context ρ.
o ∈ ObjectRefs
l ∈ IndirectRefs
C⟨T ⟩.S(o) ∈ Objects
ξ ∈ PermissionVariables⇀ StateNames ∪ {Owned,Unowned, Shared}
µ ∈ ObjectRefs⇀ Objects
ρ ∈ IndirectRefs⇀ Values
e F . . . ∣ o∣ e o (state-locking mutation detection container)∣ e o (reentrancy detection container)
s F . . . ∣ l
v F ()∣ o (values)
ϕ F ⋅ ∣ ϕ, o (Objects that are state-locked)
ψ F ⋅ ∣ψ , o (Objects that have transactions that are on the stack)
E F □∣ let x = E in e∣ E o∣ E o
We extend the previous definition of static contexts so that programs can remain well-typed as
they execute:
b ∈ x ∣ l ∣ o
∆ F b ∶ T
We extend the previous T-lookup rule to account for this extension:
T1 ⇛ T2/T3
Γ;∆,b ∶ T1 ⊢s b ∶ T2 ⊣ ∆,b ∶ T3
T-lookup
The abstract machine maintains state ⟨µ, ρ,ϕ,ψ , ξ ⟩. For concision, we abbreviate that tuple as Σ
and refer to the components as Σµ , etc. µ is used as an abbreviation for Σµ when there is only one
Σ in scope. The syntax [X/µ] Σ denotes ⟨X , ρ,ϕ,ψ , ξ ⟩; µ denotes Σµ if it occurs in X.
The dynamic semantics are similar to the dynamic semantics of FT. However, in addition to heap
µ and environment ρ, we keep a state-locking environment ϕ, which is a set of references to objects
that are state-locked. ϕ is modified for is in and checked as needed for safety, depending on the
static types.
In the scope of an if in block, we must ensure that other aliases cannot be used to violate the
state assumptions of the block. We only check for state modification, not for general field writes,
since the typestate mechanism is restricted to nominal states rather than pertaining to all properties
of objects.
Although Obsidian lacks the dynamic assert statement that can cause FT programs to get stuck,
Obsidian’s dynamic state locking can result in an expression getting stuck. While in the scope of
a dynamic state lock, transitions to a different state through a reference that does not hold the
ownership endowed by the dynamic check cause the semantics to get stuck.
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Reentrancy is checked dynamically at object granularity. Object-level reentrancy aborts the
current top-level transaction. However, as a special exception, private transactions are not protected
from reentrancy (otherwise they would be useless). Reentrancy is checked via theψ context, which
is a set of all objects that have transaction invocations on the stack.
Σ, e → Σ′, e ′
Σ, l → Σ, ρ(l) E-lookup l ∉ dom(ρ)Σ, let x ∶ T = v in e → [ρ[l ↦ v]/ρ] Σ, [l/x]e E-let
Σ, e1 → Σ
′
, e
′
1
Σ, let x ∶ T = e1 in e2 → Σ
′
, let x ∶ T = e ′1 in e2
E-letCongr
o ∉ dom(µ) de f (C) = contract C⟨TG⟩ ◁ I⟨T ⟩{. . .}
Σ, new C⟨T ⟩.S(l)→ [µ[o ↦ C⟨T ⟩.S(ρ(l))]/µ] Σ,o E-new
µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(s)
Σ, l . fi → Σ, si
E-field
µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(l) f ields(C .S) = T f
Σ, l . fi ∶= l
′
→ [µ[ρ(l)↦ C⟨T ⟩.S(o1,o2, . . . ,oi−1, ρ(l ′),oi+1, . . . ,o∣l ∣)]/µ] Σ, () E-fieldUpdate
The two invocation rules are complex. First, we look up the receiver in the heap to find its
dynamic state. In invocations of public methods, we also must check that there is not already an
invocation on the receiver in progress. Then, we make fresh indirect references l ′1 and l ′2, which
will be used to pass ownership to the transaction; residual ownership will remain in the original
indirect references l1 and l2. Then, since e may use type parameters according to the declarations of
C and tde f (C,m), we need to update ξ so that the variables are bound according to the invocation
by resolving any type variables to concrete permissions or states (via lookup). Then, we proceed
by substitution in an environment that tracks an in-progress invocation on the object referenced
by l1, which is referenced by ρ(l1). This object reference must be removed from the context after
evaluation, since the dynamic state tests in part function as sequence operators. To arrange this,
the rule steps to an expression in a box. Afterward, evaluation will proceed inside the box until
the contents of the box reaches a value, at which point the value is unboxed and the reference is
removed fromψ .
We define lookupξ (TST ) so that it looks up TST in ξ if TST is a variable, and otherwise, simply
maps to TST . This definition ensures that each permission variable maps to a concrete permission
or state, rather than a permission variable, eliminating the need for recursive lookups.
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µ(ρ(l1)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(. . .) ρ(l1) ∉ ψ
tde f (C,m) = T m⟨TM⟩(TCx .Tx ⟫TxST x)Tthis ⟫ T ′this e
l
′
1 ∉ dom(ρ) l ′2 ∉ dom(ρ) params (C) = TD
ξ
′ = ξ , PermVar(TD)↦ lookupξ (Perm(T )), PermVar(TM)↦ lookupξ (Perm(M))
Σ
′ = [l ′1 ↦ ρ(l1)/l ′2 ↦ ρ(l2)] [ξ ′/ξ ] [ψ , ρ(l1)/ψ ] Σ
Σ, l1.m⟨M⟩(l2)→ Σ′, [l ′2/x][l ′1/this]e ρ(l1) E-inv
µ(ρ(l1)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(. . .)
tde f (C,m) = TCf .Tf decl ⟫Tf ST T m⟨TM⟩(TCx .Tx ⟫TxST x) Tthis ⟫ T ′this e
l
′
1 ∉ dom(ρ) l ′2 ∉ dom(ρ) params (C) = TD
ξ
′ = ξ , PermVar(TD)↦ lookupξ (Perm(T )), PermVar(TM)↦ lookupξ (Perm(M))
Σ
′ = [l ′1 ↦ ρ(l1)/l ′2 ↦ ρ(l2)] [ξ ′/ξ ] [ψ , ρ(l1)/ψ ] Σ
Σ, l1.m⟨M⟩(l2)→ Σ′, [l ′2/x][l ′1/this]e E-privInv
lookupξ (TST ) = TST
lookupξ (p) = ξ (p) nonVar (TST )lookupξ (TST ) = TST
µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S ′(. . .)
Σ, l ↗owned S(l ′)→ [µ[ρ(l)↦ C⟨T ⟩.S(ρ(l ′))]/µ] Σ, () E-↗owned
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In E-↗shared , a shared object can transition state if it is not statelocked or the transition does
not actually change which state the object is in.
µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S ′(. . .) ρ(l) ∉ ϕ ∨ S = S ′
Σ, l ↗shared S(l ′)→ [µ[ρ(l)↦ C⟨T ⟩.S(ρ(l ′))]/µ] Σ, () E-↗shared
Σ, assert s in TST → Σ, () E-assert
ξ (p) = TST
Σ, if l is inP p then e1 else e2 → Σ, if l is inP TST then e1 else e2
E-IsIn-PermVar
Perm ∈ {Owned,Unowned, Shared} ⋅ ⊢ P <∶∗ Perm
Σ, if l is inP Perm then e1 else e2 → Σ, e1
E-IsIn-Perm-Then
Perm ∈ {Owned,Unowned, Shared} ⋅ ⊢ Perm /<∶∗ P
Σ, if l is inP Perm then e1 else e2 → Σ, e2
E-IsIn-Perm-Else
Σ, if l is inUnowned S then e1 else e2 → Σ, e2
E-IsIn-Unowned
µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S ′(. . .) S ′ ∈ S
Σ, if l is inowned S then e1 else e2 → Σ, e1
E-IsIn-Owned-Then
In E-IsIn-Shared-Then, we check ρ(l) ∉ ϕ because the static semantics that correspond generate
a temporary owning reference. If we didn’t check, or we allowed nested checks, we would generate
multiple distinct temporary owning references.
µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(. . .) ρ(l) ∉ ϕ
Σ, if l is inshared S then e1 else e2 → [ϕ, ρ(l)/ϕ] Σ, e1 ρ(l) E-IsIn-Shared-Then
µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S ′(. . .) S ′ ∉ S
Σ, if l is inp S then e1 else e2 → Σ, e2
E-IsIn-Else
Σ,disown s → Σ, () E-disown
Σ,pack→ Σ, () E-pack
Silica maintains two contexts that FT does not. ϕ records which objects are currently state-locked
because evaluation is currently inside the body of a dynamic state check.ψ records which objects
are receivers of invocations that are on the stack in order to detect reentrancy. In order to remove
objects from these two contexts, we introduce two new constructs, e o and e
o . They each permit
the boxed expression to first evaluate to a value, and then afterward remove the corresponding
object reference from the appropriate context.
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Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′
Γ;∆ ⊢s e o ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′ T-state-mutation-detection
Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′
Γ;∆ ⊢s e
o ∶ T ⊣ ∆′
T-reentrancy-detection
Σ, v o → [(ϕ \ o)/ϕ] Σ,v E-box-ϕ Σ, v o → [(ψ \ o)/ψ ] Σ,v E-box-ψ
Σ, e → Σ
′
, e
′
Σ, e o → Σ
′
, e’ o
E-box-ϕ-congr
Σ, e → Σ
′
, e
′
Σ, e o → Σ′, e’
o E-box-ψ -congr
6.4 Silica Soundness and Asset Retention
In this section, we outline the proof of type soundness. We also state the asset retention theorem,
which formally states the property that owned references to assets can only be dropped with the
disown operation. Full proofs can be found in the appendix.
As with FT, we extend type contexts to include object references o and indirect references l .
b ∈ x ∣ l ∣ o
∆ ∶∶= b ∶ T
Then we must use revised rules that take these references into account:
T1 ⇛ T2/T3
Γ;∆,b ∶ T1 ⊢s b ∶ T2 ⊣ ∆,b ∶ T3
T-Lookup
We need typing for ():
Γ;∆ ⊢s () ∶ unit ⊣ ∆ T-()
We extend simple expressions to include indirect references:
s F x∣ l
Global consistency defines consistency among static and runtime environments. It requires that
every indirect reference to an object in ρ maps to a legitimate indirect reference in µ and that ρ
maps indirect references to appropriately-typed values. It also requires that every type in the static
context correspond with an indirect reference in the indirect reference context. The permission
variables must be available for lookup in ξ and map to concrete permissions or states. Finally, every
object in the heap must have only compatible aliases, as expressed by reference consistency.
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Γ, Σ,∆ ok Global Consistency
ranдe(ρ) ⊂ dom(µ) ∪ {()}
dom(∆) ⊂ dom(ρ) ∪ dom(µ){l ∣ (l ∶ unit) ∈ ∆} ⊂ {l ∣ ρ(l) = ()}{l ∣ (l ∶ boolean) ∈ ∆} ⊂ ({l ∣ ρ(l) ∈ {true, f alse}}{l ∣ (l ∶ T ) ∈ ∆} ⊂ {l ∣ ρ(l) = o}
PermVar (Γ) ⊂ {p ∣ ξ (p) = TST }
∀s ∶ TC .TST ∈ ∆,∃C,T s.t. TC = C⟨T ⟩
Σ,∆ ⊢ dom(µ) ok
Γ, Σ,∆ ok
Reference consistency expresses the requirement that all aliases to a given object must be compat-
ible with each other and consistent with the actual type of the object in the heap. It also requires
that objects in the heap have the right number of fields. The fact that the fields must reference
objects of appropriate type is implied by the requirement that all references must reference objects
of types consistent with the reference types.
Σ,∆ ⊢ o ok Reference Consistency
µ(o) = C⟨T ⟩.S(o′) ∣o′∣ = ∣stateFields(C, S)∣
re f Types(Σ,∆,o) = D ⋅ ⊢ C⟨T ⟩ <∶ D
∀T1,T2 ∈ D,T1 ↔ T2 or StateLockCompatible(T1,T2)
Σ,∆ ⊢ o ok
where
StateLockCompatible(T1,T2) ≜ o ∈ Σϕ ∧ ((i ≠ j) ⟹ owned(Ti) ∧Tj = C⟨T ⟩.Shared)
StateLockCompatible is defined in order to allow the original Shared alias (via which the state
was checked) to co-exist with the state-specifying reference. This would not normally be permitted,
but is safe while o ∈ Σϕ because the shared alias cannot be used to mutate typestate while that is
the case.
The relation↔ defines compatibility between pairs of aliases:
T1 ↔ T2 Alias Compatibility
T2 ↔ T1
T1 ↔ T2
SymCompat
C⟨T ⟩.TST ↔ C⟨T ⟩.T ′ST
C⟨T ⟩.TST ↔ I⟨T ⟩.TST SubtypeCompat
C⟨T ⟩.TST ↔ C⟨T ⟩.T ′ST
C⟨T ⟩.TST ↔ C⟨T ′⟩.T ′ST ParamCompat TC .Unowned ↔ TC .Unowned UUCompat
TC .Unowned ↔ TC .Shared
USCompat
TC .Unowned ↔ TC .Owned
UOCompat
TC .Unowned ↔ TC .S
UStatesCompat
TC .Shared↔ TC .Shared
SCompat
re f Types computes the set of types of referencing aliases to a given object in a given static and
dynamic context. References may be from fields of objects in the heap; from indirect references;
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and from variables in the static context. Fields of objects in the heap include both fields whose
types are specified in their declarations and fields whose types are overridden temporarily in the
static context ∆.
re f Types(Σ,∆,o) = re f FieldTypes(µ,o)++ envTypes(Σ,o)++ ctxTypes(∆,o)
re f FieldTypes(µ,o) = ++
o ′∈dom(µ)[Ti ∣ µ(o′) = C⟨T ⟩.S(o), f t(∆,C⟨T ⟩, S) = T f and o ∈ o]
f t(∆,C, S) = [T f ∣ s . f ∶ T ∈ ∆] ∪ (allFields(C, S) \ [T f ∣ s . f ∈ dom(∆)])
envTypes(Σ,∆,o) = ++
l∈dom(ρ)[T ∣ Σρ(l) = o and (l ∶ T ) ∈ ∆]
ctxTypes(∆,o) = [T ∣ o ∶ T ∈ ∆]
Definition 6.1 (<l ). A context ∆ is l-stronger than a context ∆′ with respect to Γ and Σ (denoted
∆ <lΓ,Σ ∆
′) if and only if for all l ′ ∶ T ′ ∈ ∆′, there is some T and l such that Γ ⊢ T <∶ T ′, l ∶ T ∈ ∆,
T ≈ T ′, and Σ′ρ(l) = Σ′ρ(l ′).
Note that this differs from the definition of <l given in FT. Here, the indirect reference in the two
contexts need not match. This weakening is necessary because permissions are split in invocations.
After an invocation, the new expression typechecks in a context that may retain some of the
permissions from the original reference (whereas the remaining permissions were transferred to the
invocation, i.e. retained in a different indirect reference). This means that although the permissions
are still at least as strong in the new context, the strongest permission may be held by a different
indirect reference than in the original.
Corollary 6.1 (<l -reflexivity). For all ∆, Γ, Σ, ∆ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆.
Proof. Trivial application of the definition because <∶ is reflexive. □
Lemma 6.1 (Canonical forms). If Γ;∆ ⊢s v ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′, then:
(1) If T = C⟨T ′⟩.S , then v = C⟨T ′⟩.S(s).
(2) If T = unit, then v = ().
Proof. By inspection of the typing rules. □
Lemma 6.2 (Memory consistency). If Γ, Σ,∆ ok, then:
(1) If l ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.S ∈ ∆, then ∃o.ρ(l) = o and µ(o) = C⟨T ′⟩.S(s).
(2) If Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′, and l is a free variable of e , then l ∈ dom(ρ).
Theorem 6.2 (Progress). If e is a closed expression and Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′, then at least one of
the following holds:
(1) e is a value
(2) For any environment Σ such that Γ, Σ,∆ ok, Σ, e → Σ′, e ′ for some environment Σ′
(3) e is stuck at a bad state transition — that is, e = E[l ↗Shared S(s)] where µ(ρ(l)) =
C⟨T ′⟩.S ′(. . .), S ≠ S ′, ρ(l) ∈ ϕ, and Γ;∆ ⊢s l ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.Shared ⊣ ∆′.
(4) e is stuck at a reentrant invocation – that is, e = E[l .m(s)] where µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ′⟩.S(. . .),
ρ(l) ∈ ψ .
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(5) e is stuck in a nested dynamic state check – that is, e = E[if s inshared T ST then e1 else e2]
where µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(. . .) and ρ(l) ∈ ϕ.
Proof. The proof, which proceeds by induction on the typing derivation, can be found in the
appendix. □
Theorem 6.3 (Preservation). If e is a closed expression, Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′′, Γ, Σ,∆ ok, and
Σ, e → Σ′, e ′ then for some ∆′, Γ′;∆′ ⊢s e
′ ∶ T ′ ⊣ ∆′′′, Γ′, Σ′,∆′ ok, and ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′.
Proof. The proof, which proceeds by induction on the dynamic semantics, can be found in the
appendix. □
Informally, asset retention is the property that if a well-typed expression e takes a step in an
appropriate dynamic context, then owning references to assets are only dropped if e is a disown
operation.
Theorem 6.4 (Asset retention). Suppose:
(1) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(2) o ∈ dom(µ)
(3) re f Types(Σ,∆,o) = D
(4) Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′
(5) e is closed
(6) Σ, e → Σ′, e ′
(7) re f Types(Σ′,∆′,o) = D ′
(8) ∃T ′ ∈ D such that Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (T ′)
(9) ∀T ′ ∈ D ′ ∶ Γ ⊢ disposable (T ′)
Then in the context of a well-typed program, either Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (T ) or e = E[disown s],
where ρ(s) = o.
Proof. The proof, which proceeds by induction on the typing derivation, can be found in the
appendix. □
7 EVALUATION
Beyond the formative user studies that helped us design the language, we wanted to ensure that
Obsidian can be used to specify typical smart contracts in a concise and reasonable way. Therefore,
we undertook two case studies to assess the extent to which Obsidian is suitable for implementing
appropriate smart contracts.
Obsidian’s type system has significant implications for the design and implementation of software
relative to a traditional object-oriented language. We were interested in evaluating several research
questions using the case studies:
(RQ1) Does the aliasing structure in real blockchain applications allow use of ownership (and
therefore typestate)? If so, what are the implications on architecture? Or, alternatively, do so
many objects need to be Shared that the main benefit of typestate is that it helps ensure that
programmers insert dynamic tests when required?
(RQ2) To what extent does the use of typestate reduce the need for explicit state checks and
assertions, which would otherwise be necessary?
(RQ3) Can realistic systems be built with Obsidian?
(RQ4) To what extent do realistic systems have constructs that are naturally expressed as states
and assets?
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To address the research questions above, we were interested in implementing a blockchain
application in Obsidian. To obtain realistic results, we looked for a domain in which:
• Use of a blockchain platform for the application provided significant advantages over a
traditional, centralized platform.
• We could engage with a real client to ensure that the requirements were driven by real needs,
not by convenience of the developer or by the appropriateness of language features.
• The application seemed likely to be representative in structure of a large class of blockchain
applications.
7.1 Case study 1: Parametric Insurance
7.1.1 Motivation. A summary of this case study based on an earlier version of the language was
previously described by Koronkevich [2018]1, but here we provide substantially more analysis and
the implementation addresses more use cases, and the previous manuscript was not published in
an archival form.
In parametric insurance, a buyer purchases a claim, specifying a parameter that governs when
the policy will pay out. The parameter is chosen so that whether conditions satisfy the parameter
can be determined objectively. For example, a farmer might buy drought insurance as parametric
insurance, specifying that if the soil moisture index (a property derived from weather conditions)
in a particular location drops below m in a particular time window, the policy should pay out.
The insurance is then priced according to the risk of the specified event. In contrast, traditional
insurance would require that the farmer summon a claims adjuster, who could exercise subjective
judgment regarding the extent of the crop damage. Parametric insurance is particularly compelling
in places where the potential policyholders do not trust potential insurers, who may send dishonest
or unfair adjusters. In that context, potential policyholders may also be concerned with the stability
and trustworthiness of the insurer: what if the insurer pockets the insurance premium and goes
bankrupt, or otherwise refuses to pay out legitimate claims?
In order to build a trustworthy insurance market for farmers in parts of the world without
trust between farmers and insurers, the World Bank became interested in deploying an insurance
marketplace on a blockchain platform. We partnered with the World Bank to use this application
as a case study for Obsidian. We used the case study both to evaluate Obsidian as well as to improve
Obsidian, and we describe below results in both categories.
The case study was conducted primarily by an undergraduate who was not involved in the
language design, with assistance and later extensions by the language designers. The choice to
have an undergraduate do the case study was motivated by the desire to learn about what aspects
of the language were easy or difficult to master. It was also motivated by the desire to reduce bias;
a language designer studying their own language might be less likely to observe interesting and
important problems with the language.
Wemet regularly with members of theWorld Bank team to ensure that our implementation would
be consistent with their requirements. We began by eliciting requirements, structured according to
their expectations of the workflow for participants.
7.1.2 Requirements. The main users of the insurance system are farmers, insurers, and banks.
Banks are necessary in order to mediate financial relationships among the parties. We assume that
farmers have local accounts with their banks, and that the banks can transfer money to the insurers
through the existing financial network. Basic assumptions of trust drove the design:
1Unpublished draft.
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• Farmers trust their banks, with whom they already do business, but do not trust insurers,
who may attempt to pocket their premiums and disappear without paying out policies.
• Insurers do not trust farmers to accurately report on the weather; they require a trusted
weather service to do that. They do trust the implementation of the smart contracts to pay
out claims when appropriate and to otherwise refund payout funds to the insurers at policy
expiration.
• There exists a mutually trusted weather service, which can provide signed evidence of weather
events.
7.1.3 Design. Because blockchains typically require all operations to be deterministic and all
transactions to be invoked externally, we derived the following design:
• Farmers are responsible for requesting claims and providing acceptable proof of a relevant
weather event in order to receive a payout.
• Insurers are responsible for requesting refunds when policies expire.
• A trusted, off-blockchain weather service is available that can, on request, provide signed
weather data relevant to a particular query.
An alternative approach would involve the weather service handling weather subscriptions. The
blockchain insurance service would emit events indicating that it subscribed to particular weather
data, and the weather service would invoke appropriate blockchain transactions when relevant
conditions occurred. However, this design is more complex and requires trusting the weather
service to push requests in a timely manner. Our design is simpler but requires that policyholders
invoke the claim transactions, passing appropriate signed weather records.
Our design of the application allows farmers to start the exchange by requesting bids from
insurers. Then, to offer a bid, insurers are required to specify a premium and put the potential
payout in escrow; this ensures that even if the insurer goes bankrupt later, the policy can pay
out if appropriate. If the farmer chooses to purchase a policy, the farmer submits the appropriate
payment.
Later, if a weather event occurs that would justify filing a claim, a farmer requests a signed
weather report from the weather service. The farmer submits a claim transaction to the insurance
service, which sends the virtual currency to the farmer. The farmer could then present the virtual
currency to their real-world bank to enact a deposit.
7.1.4 Results. The implementation consists of 545 non-comment, non-whitespace lines of Obsidian
code. For simplicity, the implementation is limited to one insurer, who can make one bid on a policy
request. An overview of the invocations that are sent and results that are received in a typical
successful bid and claim scenario is shown in Fig. 9. All of the objects reside in the blockchain
except as noted. The full code for this case study is available online2.
We made several observations about Obsidian. In some cases, we were able to leverage our
observations to improve the language. In others, we learned lessons about the implications of the
type system on application design and architecture.
First, in the version of the language that existed when the case study started, Obsidian included an
explicit ownership transfer operator <-. In that version of the language, passing an owned reference as
an argument would only transfer ownership to the callee if the argument was decorated with <-. For
example, deposit(<-m) would transfer ownership of the reference m to the deposit transaction,
but deposit(m) would be a type error because deposit requires an Owned reference. While
redundant with type information, we had included the <- operator because we thought it would
2https://github.com/mcoblenz/Obsidian/tree/master/resources/case_studies/Insurance
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Fig. 9. Invocations sent and results returned in a typical successful bid/claim scenario.
reduce confusion, but we noticed while using the language (both in the case study and in smaller
examples) that its presence was onerous. We removed it, which was a noticeable simplification.
Second, in that version of the language, asset was a property of contracts. We noticed in the
insurance case study that it is more appropriate to think of asset as a property of states, since some
states own assets and some do not. In the case study, an instance of the PolicyRecord contract
holds the insurer’s money (acting as an escrow) while a policy is active, but after the policy is
expired or paid, the contract no longer holds money (and therefore no longer needs to itself be an
asset). It is better to not mark extraneous objects as assets, since assets must be explicitly discarded,
and only assets can own assets. Each of those requirements imposes a burden on the programmer.
This burden can be helpful in detecting bugs, but should not be borne when not required. We
changed the language so that asset applies to individual states rather than only entire contracts.
Third, the type system in Obsidian has significant implications on architecture. In a traditional
object-oriented language, it is feasible to have many aliases to an object, with informal conventions
regarding relationships between the object and the referencing objects. UML also distinguishes
between composition, which implies ownership, and aggregation, which does not, reinforcing
the idea that ownership in the sense in which Obsidian uses it is common and useful in typical
object-oriented designs. Because of the use of ownership in Obsidian, using typestate with a design
that does not express ownership sometimes requires refining the design so that it does. In the case
study, we found applying ownership useful in refining our design. For example, when an insurance
policy is purchased, the insurance service must hold the payout virtual currency until either the
policy expires or it is paid. While the insurance service holds the currency, it must associate the
currency for a policy with the policy itself. Does the policy, therefore, own the Money? If so, what is
the relationship between the client, who purchased the policy and has certain kinds of control over
it, and the Policy, which cannot be held by the (untrusted) client? We resolved this question by
adding a new object, the PolicyRecord. A PolicyRecord, which is itself Owned by the insurance
service, has an Unowned reference to the Policy and an Owned reference to a Money object. This
means that PolicyRecord is an asset when it is active (because it owns Money, which is itself an
asset) but Policy does not need to be an asset. We found that thinking about ownership according
to the Obsidian type system helped us refine and clarify our design. Without ownership, we might
have chosen a less carefully-considered design.
It is instructive to compare the Obsidian implementation to a partial Solidity implementation,
which we wrote for comparison purposes. Figure 10 shows an example of why parts of the Obsidian
implementation are substantially shorter. Note how the Solidity implementation requires repeated
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run time tests to make sure each function only runs when the receiver is in the appropriate state.
Obsidian code only invokes those transactions when the Policy object is in appropriate state; the
runtime executes an equivalent dynamic check to ensure safety when the transactions are invoked
from outside Obsidian code. Also, the Solidity implementation has cost and expirationTime
fields in scope when inappropriate, so they need to be initialized repeatedly. In the Obsidian
implementation, they are only set when the object is in the Offered state. Finally, the Solidity
implementation must track the state manually via currentState and the States type, whereas this
is done automatically in the Obsidian implementation. However, Solidity supports some features
that are convenient and lead to more concise code: the Solidity compiler automatically generates
getters for public fields, whereas Obsidian requires the user to write them manually, and built-in
arrays can be convenient. However, the author of the Solidity implementation must be very careful
to manage money manually; any money that is received by transactions must be accounted for,
or the money will be stuck in the contract forever. Solidity also lacks a math library; completing
the implementation would require us to provide our own square root function (which we use to
compute distances).
We showed our implementation to our World Bank collaborators, and they agreed that it rep-
resents a promising design. There are various aspects of the full system that are not part of the
case study, such as properly verifying cryptographic signatures of weather data, communicating
with a real weather service and a real bank, and supporting multiple banks and insurers. However,
in only a cursory review, one of the World Bank economists noticed a bug in the Obsidian code:
the code always approved a claim requests even if the weather did not justify a claim according to
the policy’s parameters. This brings to light two important observations. First, Obsidian, despite
being a novel language, is readable enough to new users that they were able to understand the
code. Second, type system-based approaches find particular classes of bugs, but other classes of
bugs require either traditional approaches or formal verification to find.
7.2 Case study 2: Shipping
7.2.1 Motivation. Supply chain tracking is one of the commonly-proposed applications for blockchains
[IBM 2019]. As such, wewere interested in what implications Obsidian’s design would have on an ap-
plication that tracks shipments as they move through a supply chain. We collaborated with partners
at IBM Research to conduct a case study of a simple shipping application. Our collaborators wrote
most of the code, with occasional Obsidian help from us. We updated the implementation to use the
polymorphic LinkedList contract, which became available only after the original implementation
was done.
7.2.2 Results. The final implementation3 consists of 141 non-comment, non-whitespace, non-
printing lines of Obsidian code. We found it very encouraging that they were able to write the case
study with relatively little input from us, especially considering that Obsidian is a research prototype
with extremely limited documentation. Although this is smaller than the insurance case study,
we noticed some interesting relationships between the Obsidian type system and object-oriented
design.
Fig. 11 summarizes an early design of the Shipping application4, focusing on a particular owner-
ship problem. The implementation does not compile; the compiler reports three problems. First,
LegList’s arrived transaction attempts to invoke setArrival via a reference of type Leg@Unowned;
this is disallowed because setArrival changes the state of its receiver, which is unsafe through an
Unowned reference. Second, append in LegList takes an Unowned leg to append, but uses it
3https://github.com/laredo/Shipping
4This version corresponds with git commit 8106e406e8ca005f8878dea5ac78e54b439fe509 in the Shipping repository.
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contract Policy {
state Offered {
int cost;
int expirationTime;
}
state Active;
state Expired;
state Claimed;
Policy@Offered(int c, int expiration) {
->Offered(cost = c, expirationTime = expiration );
}
transaction activate(Policy@Offered >> Active this) {
->Active;
}
transaction expire(Policy@Offered >> Expired this) {
->Expired;
}
}
(a) Obsidian implementation of a Policy contract.
contract Policy {
enum States {Offered , Active , Expired}
States public currentState;
uint public cost;
uint public expirationTime;
constructor (uint _cost , uint _expirationTime) public {
cost = _cost;
expirationTime = _expirationTime;
currentState = States.Offered;
}
function activate () public {
require(currentState == States.Offered ,
"Can't␣activate␣Policy␣not␣in␣Offered␣state.");
currentState = States.Active;
cost = 0;
expirationTime = 0;
}
function expire () public {
require(currentState == States.Offered ,
"Can't␣expire␣Policy␣not␣in␣Offered␣state.");
currentState = States.Expired;
cost = 0;
expirationTime = 0;
}
}
(b) Solidity implementation of a Policy contract.
Fig. 10. Comparison between Obsidian and Solidity implementations of a Policy contract from the insurance
case study.
to transition to the HasNext state, which requires an Owned object. Third, Transport’s depart
transaction attempts to append a new Leg to its legList. It does so by calling the Leg constructor,
which takes a Shared Transport. But calling this constructor passing an owned reference (this)
causes the caller’s reference to become Shared, not Owned, which is inconsistent with the type of
depart, which requires that this be owned (and specifically in state InTransport).
Fig. 12 shows the final design of the application. This version passes the type checker. Note
how a LegList contains only Arrived references to Leg objects. One Leg may be InTransit, but
that is owned by the Transport when it is in an appropriate state (also InTransit). Each Leg has
an Unowned reference to its Transport, allowing the TransportList to own the Transport. A
TransportList likewise only contains objects in Unload state; one Transport in InTransport
state is referenced at the Shipment level.
We argue that although the type checker forced the programmer to revise the design, the revised
design is better. In the first design, collections (TransportList and LegList) contain objects of
dissimilar types. In the revised design, these collections contain only objects in the same state.
This change is analogous to the difference between dynamically-typed languages, such as LISP, in
which collections may have objects of inconsistent type, and statically-typed languages, such as
Java, in which the programmer reaps benefits by making collections contain objects of consistent
type. The typical benefit is that when one retrieves an object from the collection, there is no
need to case-analyze on the element’s type, since all of the elements have the same type. This
means that there can be no bugs that arise from neglecting to case-analyze, as can happen in the
dynamically-typed approach.
The revised version also reflects a better division of responsibilities among the components. For
example, in the first version (Fig. 11), LegList is responsible for both maintaining the list of legs as
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TransportList@Owned transportList;
Transport
state Load;
state InTransport {
}
state Unload;
LegList@Owned legList;
LegList@Shared cLeg;
depart(Transport@Load >> InTransport this);
LegList
state Empty;
state HasNext {
   LegList@Owned next;
}
Leg@Unowned value;
arrived();
append(Leg@Unowned pLeg) 
    returns LegList@Shared;
Leg
state InTransit;
state Arrived;
Transport@Shared carrier;
Leg@InTransit(Transport@Shared t,? );
setArrival(Leg@InTransit  >> Arrived this, ? );
TransportList
state Empty;
state HasNext {
    TransportList@Owned next;
}
Transport@Unowned value;
transportList
value legList
value
carrier
@Owned reference
@Unowned reference
@Shared reference
Fig. 11. Initial design of the Shipping application (which does not compile).
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Shipment
TransportList@Owned transportList;
Transport@InTransport inTsp;
Transport
    state Load;
    state InTransport {
        Leg@InTransit currentLeg;
    }
    state Unload;
    LegList@Owned legList;
depart(Transport@Load >> InTransport this);
LegList
state Empty;
state HasNext {
   LegList@Owned next;
}
Leg@Arrived value;
append(LegList@Owned this, 
             Leg@Arrived >> Unowned pLeg);
Leg
state InTransit;
state Arrived;
Transport@Unowned carrier;
Leg@InTransit(Transport@Unowned t,? );
setArrival(Leg@InTransit  >> Arrived this, ? );
TransportList
state Empty;
state HasNext {
    TransportList@Owned next;
}
Transport@Unload value;
transportList
value legList
value
carrier
@Owned reference
@Unowned reference
@Shared reference
Fig. 12. Revised design of the Shipping application.
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well as recording when the first leg arrived. This violates the single responsibility principle [Martin
et al. 2003]. In the revised version, LegList only maintains a list of Leg objects; updating their
states is implemented elsewhere.
One difficulty we noticed in this case study, however, is that sometimes there is a conceptual gap
between the relatively low-level error messages given by the compiler and the high-level design
changes needed in order to improve the design. For example, the first error message in the initial
version of the application shown in Fig. 11 is: Cannot invoke setArrival on a receiver of
type Leg@Owned; a receiver of type Leg@InTransit is required. The programmer is
required to figure out what changes need to be made; in this case, the arrived transaction should
not be on LegList; instead, LegList should only include legs that are already in state Arrived.
We hypothesize that more documentation and tooling may be helpful to encourage designers to
choose designs that will be suitable for the Obsidian type system.
We also implemented a version of the Shipping application in Solidity, which required 197
non-comment, non-whitespace lines, so the Obsidian version took 72% as many lines as the Solidity
version. This makes the Obsidian version The translation was straightforward; we translated each
state precondition to a runtime assertion, and we flattened fields in states to the top (contract) level.
Although the types no longer express the structural constraints that exist in the Obsidian version,
the general structure of the code and data structures was identical except that we implemented
containers with native Solidity arrays rather than linked lists. As with the prior case study, the
additional length required for Solidity was generally due to runtime checks of properties that were
established statically in the Obsidian version.
7.3 Case Study Summary
We asked six research questions above. We return to them now and summarize what we found.
(1) The aliasing structure in the blockchain applications we implemented does allow use of
ownership and typestate. However, it forces the programmer to carefully choose an ownership
structure, rather than using ad hoc aliases. This can be both restrictive but also result in a
simpler, cleaner design.
(2) Implementing smart contracts in Solidity typically requires a couple of lines of assertions for
every function in smart contracts that are designed to use states. This makes the Obsidian code
more concise, although some features that Obsidian currently lacks (such as auto-generated
getters) improve concision in Solidity.
(3) We and our collaboratorswere able to successfully build nontrivial smart contracts in Obsidian,
despite the fact that Obsidian is a research prototype without much documentation.
(4) The applications that we chose benefited from representation with assets and states, since
they represented objects of value and the transactions that were possible at any given time
depended on the state of the object. Of course, not every application of smart contracts has
this structure.
8 FUTUREWORK
Obsidian is a promising smart contract language, but it should not exist in isolation. Authors
of applications for blockchain systems (known as distributed applications, or Dapps) need to be
able to integrate smart contracts with front-end applications, such as web applications. Typically,
developers need to invoke smart contract transactions from JavaScript. We would like to build a
mechanism for JavaScript applications to safely invoke transactions on Obsidian smart contracts.
One possible approach is to embed Obsidian code in JavaScript to enable native interaction, coupled
with a mapping between Obsidian objects and JSON.
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Obsidian currently has limited IDE support; we plan to improve our existing extension for Visual
Studio Code so that programmers can receive live feedback on errors while they edit Obsidian code.
In the current implementation, Obsidian clients invoke all remote transactions sequentially. This
means that another remote user might run intervening transactions, violating assumptions of the
client program. More discussion of approaches to address this can be found in §5.2.
The type system-oriented approach in Obsidian is beneficial for many users, but it does not
lead to verification of domain-specific program properties. In the future, it would be beneficial to
augment Obsidian with a verification mechanism so that users can prove relevant properties of
their programs formally.
We plan to conduct a summative user study in which we compare Obsidian to Solidity. We
hope to show that programmers using Obsidian successfully complete relevant programming tasks
without inserting bugs that the Solidity programmers accidentally insert.
Finally, Obsidian currently only supports Hyperledger Fabric. We would like to target Ethereum
as well in order to demonstrate generality of the language as well as to enable more potential users
to use the language.
9 CONCLUSIONS
With Obsidian we have shown how:
• Typestate can be combined with assets to provide relevant safety properties for smart con-
tracts, including asset retention.
• A unified approach for smart contracts and client programs can provide safety properties
that cannot be provided using the approaches that are currently in use.
• A core calculus can encode key features of Obsidian and form a sound foundation for the
language.
• Applications can be built successfully with typestate and assets, with useful implications on
architecture and object-oriented design.
Obsidian represents a promising approach for smart contract programming, including sound
foundations and an implementation that enables real programs to execute on a blockchain platform.
By formalizing useful safety guarantees and providing them in a programming language that
was designed with user input, we hope to significantly improve safety of smart contracts that
real programmers write. By combining techniques from human-computer interaction, traditional
principles of type system design, and evaluation via case studies, we can obtain a language that is
much better than if we used only one of those techniques alone.
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A.1 Main Soundness Theorems
Theorem A.1 (Progress). If e is a closed expression and Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′, then at least one of
the following holds:
(1) e is a value
(2) For any environment Σ such that Γ, Σ,∆ ok, Σ, e → Σ′, e ′ for some environment Σ′
(3) e is stuck at a bad state transition — that is, e = E[l ↗Shared S(s)] where µ(ρ(l)) =
C⟨T ′⟩.S ′(. . .), S ≠ S ′, ρ(l) ∈ ϕ, and Γ;∆ ⊢s l ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.Shared ⊣ ∆′.
(4) e is stuck at a reentrant invocation – that is, e = E[l .m(s)] where µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ′⟩.S(. . .),
ρ(l) ∈ ψ .
(5) e is stuck in a nested dynamic state check – that is, e = E[if s inshared T ST then e1 else e2]
where µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(. . .) and ρ(l) ∈ ϕ.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′.
Case: T-lookup. e = b. We case-analyze on b.
Subcase: b = x . Then b is not closed. Contradiction.
Subcase: b = l . Suppose Γ, Σ,∆ ok. By global consistency, l ∈ dom(Σρ). Then b → Σρ(l)
by rule E-lookup.
Subcase: b = o . Then b is a value.
Case: T-let. Because e is closed, e = let x ∶ T = e1 in e2. Otherwise, since e is closed, e1 is closed,
and the induction hypothesis applies to e1. This leaves several cases:
Case: e1 is a value v The properties of the context permit creating a fresh indirect reference
l that is not in ρ. By E-let, Σ, let x ∶ T = v in e → [ρ[l ↦ v]/ρ] Σ, [l/x]e .
Case: Σ, e1 → Σ
′
, e
′
1. Then E-letCongr applies, and Σ, e → Σ
′
, let x ∶ T = e ′1 in e2.
Case: e1 is stuck with e1 = E[l ↗Shared S(s)]. Then
e = let x ∶ T = E[l ↗Shared S(s)] in e2
e = E′[l ↗Shared S(s)]
Case: e1 is stuck with e1 = E[E[l .m(s)]. Then
e = let x ∶ T = E[E[l .m(s)] in e2
e = E′[E[l .m(s)]
Case: New-state. Because e is closed, e = new C⟨T ⟩.S(l) (any variables x would be free, so all
parameters must be locations). The properties of the context permit creating a fresh object ref-
erence o that is not in µ. l are a free locations of e , so bymemory consistency (A.1), l ∈ dom(ρ),
and ρ(l) is well-defined. By E-new, Σ, new C⟨T ⟩.S(l)→ [µ[o ↦ C⟨T ⟩.S(ρ(l))]/µ] Σ,o.
Case: T-this-field-def. Because e is closed, e = l . fi . By assumption:
(1) Γ;∆ ⊢l l . fi ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′.
(2) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
By memory consistency, ρ(l) = o for some o and µ(o) = C⟨T ′⟩.S(s ′). Note that 1 ≤ i ≤ ∣s ′∣
by well-typedness of s . fi and global consistency. By rule E-field, Σ, s . fi → Σ, s
′
i .
Case: T-this-field-ctxt. Identical to the This-field-def case.
Case: T-field-update. Because e is closed, e = l . fi ∶= l ′. By memory consistency, µ(ρ(l)) =
C⟨T ′⟩.S(l ′′). f ields(C⟨T ′⟩.S) is ambiently available. By E-fieldUpdate, Σ, l . fi ∶= l ′ → [µ[ρ(l)↦
C⟨T ′⟩.S(l ′′1 , l ′′2 , . . . , l ′′i−1, l ′, l ′′i+1, . . . , l ′′∣l ′′∣)]/µ] Σ, ().
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Case: T-inv. Because e is closed, e = l1.m⟨T ⟩(l2). By memory consistency, µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ′⟩.S(. . .).
The transaction is ambiently available. We generate fresh l ′1 and l
′
2 so that they are not in
dom(ρ). If rho(l1) ∈ ψ , then e is stuck at a reentrant invocation. Otherwise, let
(1) Σ′ = Σ[l ′1 ↦ ρ(l1)][l ′2 ↦ ρ(l2)]
(2) ξ ′ = PermVar(TD)↦ Perm(T ), PermVar(TG)↦ Perm(TM)
(3) Σ′′ = [ξ ′/ξ ] [ψ , ρ(l1)/ψ ] Σ′
(4) e ′ = tde f (C,m)
Then by E-Inv, Σ, e → Σ′′, [l ′1/x][l ′2/this]e ′ ρ(l1)
Case: T-privInv. Analogous to the Public-Invoke case, using rule E-Inv-Private, except that the
invocation is never stuck (E-Inv-Private does not check that rho(l1) ∉ ψ ).
Case: T-↗p . Because e is closed, e = l ↗p S(l ′). By assumption, l ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.TST . By memory
consistency, l ∈ dom(ρ) and µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ′⟩.S(. . .). We case-analyze on TST .
Subcase: TST = S or TST = Owned .
By E-↗owned , Σ, l ↗owned S(l ′)→ [µ[ρ(l)↦ C⟨T ′⟩.S(l ′)]/µ] Σ, ()
Subcase: TST = Shared .
Case: ρ(l) ∉ ϕ. Then by E-↗shared ,
Σ, l ↗shared S(l ′)→ [µ[ρ(l)↦ C⟨T ′⟩.S(l ′)]/µ] Σ, ().
Case: µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ′⟩.S(. . .). Then by E-↗shared ,
Σ, l ↗shared S(l ′)→ [µ[ρ(l)↦ C⟨T ′⟩.S(l ′)]/µ] Σ, ().
Case: e is stuck at a bad state transition. In that case, we have
e = E[l ↗Shared S(l ′)] where µ(ρ(l)) = C∗⟨T∗⟩.S ′(. . .), S ≠ S ′, ρ(l) ∈ ϕ, and Γ;∆ ⊢s
l ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.Shared ⊣ ∆′. C = C∗ due to memory consistency.
Subcase: TST = Unowned. This case is impossible because it contradicts the antecedent
TST ≠ Unowned of T-↗p .
Case: T-assertStates. Because e is closed, e = assert l in S . By rule E-assert, Σ, assert l in S →
Σ, ().
Case: T-assertPermission. Because e is closed, e = assert l inTST . By rule E-assert, Σ, assert l in TST →
Σ, ().
Case: T-assertInVar. Because e is closed, e = assert l inTST . By rule E-assert, Σ, assert l in TST →
Σ, ().
Case: T-assertInVarAlready. Because e is closed, e = assert l inTST . By rule E-assert, Σ, assert l in TST →
Σ, ().
Case: T-isInStaticOwnership. Because e is closed, e = if l inowned S then e1 else e2. By memory
consistency, there exists S’ such that µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ′⟩.S ′(. . .).
Subcase: S ′ = S . Then by E-IsIn-Dynamic-Match-Owned, Σ, e → Σ, e1.
Subcase: S ′ ≠ S . By IsIn-Dynamic-Else, Σ, e → Σ, e2.
Case: T-isInDynamic. Because e is closed, e = if l inshared S then e1 else e2. By memory consis-
tency, l ∈ dom(ρ) and there exists S’ such that µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ′⟩.S ′(. . .).
By inversion, we have l ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.Shared.
Subcase: S ′ = S . Then if ρ(l) ∈ ϕ then we are stuck in a nested dynamic state check. Other-
wise, by E-IsIn-Dynamic-Match-Shared, Σ, e → [ϕ, ρ(l)/ϕ] Σ, e1 ρ(l).
Subcase: S ′ ≠ S . By IsIn-Dynamic-Else, Σ, e → Σ, e2.
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Case: T-IsIn-PermVar. Because e is closed, e = if l inP p then e1 else e2. By assumption
Γ, Σ,∆ ok, so ξ (p) = TST for someTST . Then Σ, if l inP p then e1 else e2 → Σ, if l inPTST then e1 else e2.
Case: T-IsIn-Perm-Then. Because e is closed, e = if l inp Perm then e1 else e2. By inversion,
Γ ⊢ P <∶∗ Perm. As both P and Perm are permissions, not variables, we have ⋅ ⊢ P <∶∗ Perm,
so by E-IsIn-Permission-Else Σ, e → Σ, e1.
Case: T-IsIn-Perm-Else. Because e is closed, e = if l inp Perm then e1 else e2. By inversion,
Γ ⊢ Perm <∶∗ P , and P ≠ Perm. As both P and Perm are permissions, not variables, we have
⋅ ⊢ Perm <∶∗ P , so by E-IsIn-Permission-Else Σ, e → Σ, e2.
Case: T-IsIn-Unowned. Because e is closed, e = if l inp Perm then e1 else e2. In this case, by
E-IsIn-Unowned Σ, e → e2.
Case: T-disown. Because e is closed, e = disown l . By rule disown, Σ,disown l → Σ, ().
Case: T-pack. By pack, Σ,pack→ Σ, ().
Case: T-state-mutation-detection. Because e is closed, e = e ′ o , where e
′ is also closed. If e ′ is a
value v , then by E-Box-ϕ, Σ, v o → [(ϕ \o)/ϕ] Σ,v . Otherwise, by the induction hypothesis,
either Σ, e ′ → Σ′, e ′′, or e ′ is stuck with an appropriate evaluation context. In the former
case, by E-box-ϕ-congr, Σ, e ′ o → Σ
′
, e
′′
o . In the latter case, e is stuck with an appropriate
evaluation context.
Case: T-reentrancy-detection. Because e is closed, e = e ′
o
, where e ′ is also closed. If e ′ is a
valuev , then by E-Box-ψ , Σ, v o → [(ψ \o)/ψ ] Σ,v . Otherwise, by the induction hypothesis,
either Σ, e ′ → Σ′, e ′′, or e ′ is stuck with an appropriate evaluation context. In the former
case, by E-box-ψ -congr, Σ, e’
o
→ Σ′, e”
o
. In the latter case, e is stuck with an appropriate
evaluation context.
□
Theorem A.2 (Preservation). If e is a closed expression, Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′′, Γ, Σ,∆ ok, and
Σ, e → Σ′, e ′ then for some ∆′, Γ′;∆′ ⊢s e
′ ∶ T ′ ⊣ ∆′′′, Γ′, Σ′,∆′ ok, and ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′.
Proof. Proof proceeds by induction on the dynamic semantics.
Case: E-lookup. e = l . We case-analyze on T .
Subcase: T = unit
By assumption, Γ, Σ,∆ ok, and Γ;∆ ⊢s l ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′′. By assumption and E-Lookup, Σ, l →
Σ, Σρ(l). The fact that Σρ(l) = () follows directly from global consistency. Then by T-
(), Γ;∆ ⊢s () ∶ unit ⊣ ∆. Global consistency is immediate because the contexts are
unchanged, and ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ by <l -reflexivity.
Subcase: T = C⟨T ′⟩.TST
By inversion, ∆ = ∆0, l ∶ T0, T0 ⇛ T/T2, and ∆′′ = ∆0, l ∶ T2. By rule E-lookup, e ′ = Σρ(l).
The fact that Σρ(l) = o for some o follows directly from global consistency. l ≠ o by
construction and if o occurs in ∆0, then we apply the strengthening lemma to generate a
new proof of Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′ in which o does not occur. Thus, ∆′ = ∆′′,o ∶ T2 is a valid
typing context. Then by Var, Γ;∆′′,o ∶ T 2 ⊢s o ∶ T 2 ⊣ ∆
′′
,o ∶ T ′ for some T ′. Now, ∆′ is
the same as ∆ except that some instances of T0 have been replaced with T2. The required
consistency is obtained from the Split Compatibility lemma. We have ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ because
the two contexts differ only on o, which is not relevant to the <l relation.
Subcase: T = I⟨T ′⟩.TST or T = X .TST
By memory consistency, this case is impossible.
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Case: E-new. e = newC⟨T ′⟩.S(l) because e is closed (any variables would be free, so theymust not
exist). By assumption, Γ;∆ ⊢s new C⟨T ′⟩.S(l) ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.S ⊣ ∆′′; also, e ′ = o, and o ∉ dom(µ).
Let ∆′ = ∆′′,o ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.S . By Var, Γ;∆′′,o ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.S ⊢s o ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.S ⊣ ∆′′,o ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.Unowned .
Since o is fresh and Γ, Σ,∆ ok, there are no references to o in the previous contexts, so all
of the aliases are trivially consistent. We also have Γ ⊢ T <∶ stateFields(C⟨T ′⟩, S), where
l ∶ T ∈ ∆, which implies the required field property for reference consistency. By the split
compatibility lemma, we have Γ, Σ,∆′ ok. We have ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ because the two contexts
differ only on o, which is not relevant to the <l relation.
Case: E-let. e = let x ∶ T1 = v in e2 By assumption:
(1) Σ, let x ∶ T1 = v in e2 → [ρ[l ↦ v]/ρ] Σ, [l/x]e
(2) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(3) Γ;∆ ⊢s let x ∶ T1 = v in e2 ∶ T ⊣ ∆′′
Subcase: v = o.
(1) By inversion:
(a) Γ;∆ ⊢s o ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
∗
(b) Γ;∆∗,x ∶ T1 ⊢s e2 ∶ T ⊣ ∆
∗∗
,x ∶ T ′1
(c) Γ ⊢ disposable (T ′1)
(d) l ∉ dom(ρ)
(2) Let ∆′ = ∆∗, l ∶ T1. By the substitution lemma (A.13) applied to 1b,
Γ;∆′ ⊢s [l/x]e2 ∶ T ⊣ ∆∗∗, l ∶ T ′1.
(3) By global consistency and 1a,T1 is consistentwith all other references in re f Types(Σ,∆,o).
Now, note that by global consistency, all references were previously compatible withT1. Σ
′
now includes a reference to the same object with indirect reference l, which corresponds
with l ∶ T1 ∈ ∆′. The only rule that could have been used in 1a is T-lookup, which split
T1 ⇛ T
′
1/T3 and replaced o ∶ T1 ∈ ∆ with o ∶ T3 ∈ ∆′. By the split compatibility lemma
(A.12), T3 is compatible with all other aliases to o, and in particular with T
′
1.
(4) ∆∗∗, l ∶ T ′1 <
l
Γ,Σ′ ∆
∗∗
,x ∶ T ′1 because l ∉ dom(∆∗∗,x ∶ T ′1).
Subcase: v = (). By inversion:
(1) Γ;∆ ⊢s () ∶ unit ⊣ ∆
(2) Γ;∆,x ∶ unit ⊢s e2 ∶ T ⊣ ∆
∗
,x ∶ T ′1
(3) Γ ⊢ disposable (unit)
(4) l ∉ dom(ρ)
Let ∆′ = ∆∗, l ∶ unit. By the substitution lemma (A.13) Γ;∆∗, l ∶ unit ⊢s [l/x]e2 ∶ T ⊣
∆
∗∗
, l ∶ T ′1. Then the extensions to the contexts do not affect permissions, so they must be
compatible, and Γ, Σ′,∆′ ok. ∆∗∗, l ∶ T ′1 <
l
Γ,Σ′ ∆
∗∗
,x ∶ T ′1 because l ∉ dom(∆∗∗,x ∶ T ′1).
Case: E-letCongr. e = let x ∶ T1 = e1 in e2.
(1) By assumption:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(b) Γ;∆ ⊢s let x ∶ T1 = e1 in e2 ∶ T ⊣ ∆′′
(2) By inversion:
(a) Σ, e1 → Σ
∗
, e
′
1.
(b) Γ;∆ ⊢s e1 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
∗
(c) Γ;∆∗,x ∶ T1 ⊢s e2 ∶ T2 ⊣ ∆
∗∗
,x ∶ T ′1
(d) Γ ⊢ disposable (T ′1)
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(3) By the induction hypothesis:
(a) Γ′∗;∆′∗ ⊢s e
′
1 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′′∗ for some Γ′∗,∆′∗, and ∆′′∗
(b) Γ′∗, Σ∗,∆′∗ ok
(c) ∆′′∗ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
∗
(4) By A.5 with 3c and 2c, we have Γ;∆′′∗,x ∶ T1 ⊢s e2 ∶ T2 ⊣ ∆
∗∗∗
,x ∶ T ′1, with ∆
∗∗∗ <lΣ∗
∆
∗∗.
(5) Let ∆′ = ∆′∗ and let Γ∗∗ = Γ, Γ′∗.
Then, by rule Let with 3a, 4, and 2d, Γ∗∗;∆′ ⊢s let x ∶ T1 = e ′1 in e2 ∶ T ⊣ ∆
∗∗∗, where
∆
∗∗∗ <lΣ′ ∆
′′.
(6) By A.15, Γ∗∗, Σ′,∆′ ok.
Case: E-Inv. e = l1.m⟨M⟩(l2) because e is closed.
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Σ, l1.m⟨M⟩(l2)→ [ψ , ρ(l1)/ψ ] Σ′′, [l ′2/x][l ′1/this]e ρ(l1)
(b) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(c) Γ;∆0, l1 ∶ C⟨T ⟩.TST l1, l2 ∶ Tl2 ⊢s l1.m⟨M⟩(l2) ∶ T ⊣ ∆0, l1 ∶ T ′l1, l2 ∶ T ′l2
(2) By inversion:
(a) l ′1 ∉ dom(ρ)
(b) l ′2 ∉ dom(ρ)
(c) params (C) = TD
(d) Σ′′ = Σ[l ′1 ↦ ρ(l1)][l ′2 ↦ ρ(l2)]
(e) ξ ′ = ξ , PermVar(TD)↦ Perm(T ), PermVar(TM)↦ Perm(M)
(f) Σ′′′ = [ξ ′/ξ ] [ψ , ρ(l1)/ψ ] Σ′
(g) µ(ρ(l1)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(. . .)
(h) ρ(l1) ∉ ψ
(i) tde f (C,m) =m⟨TM⟩(Tx ⟫TxST x) Tthis ⟫ T ′this e ′
(j) Γ ⊢ C⟨T ⟩.TST l1 <∶ C⟨T ⟩.Tthis
(k) Γ ⊢ Tl2 <∶ Cx .Tx
(l) T ′l1 = funcArg (C⟨T ⟩.TST l1,C⟨T ⟩.Tthis ,C⟨T ⟩.T ′this)
(m) T ′l2 = funcArg (Tl2,Tx ,Cx .TxST )
(3) We assume that the transaction is well-typed in its contract:
T m⟨M⟩(Cx .Tx ⟫TxST x)Tthis ⟫ T ′this e ok in C . As a result, we additionally have (by in-
version):
(a) TD ,TG ; this ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Tthis , x ∶ Cx .Tx ⊢s1 e ∶ T ⊣ this ∶ C⟨T ⟩.T ′this ,x ∶ Cx .TxST
Then by the substitution lemma for interfaces (A.9), we also have
(a) TD ,TG ; this ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Tthis , x ∶ C ′⟨T ′⟩.Tx ⊢s1 e ∶ T ⊣ this ∶ C⟨T ⟩.T ′this ,x ∶ C ′⟨T ′⟩.TxST
where l2 ∶ C ′⟨T ′⟩.T ′ST , by global consistency.
(4) Let Γ′ = Γ,TD ,TM . By the substitution lemma (A.13) on 3a, we have:
Γ
′; l ′1 ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Tthis , l ′2 ∶ C ′⟨T ′⟩.Tx ⊢s1 [l ′2/x][l ′1/this]e ∶ T ⊣ l ′1 ∶ C⟨T ⟩.T ′this , l ′2 ∶ C ′⟨T ′⟩.TxST
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(5) Let:
Tl1R = funcArgResidual (C⟨T ⟩.TST l1,C⟨T ⟩.Tthis ,C⟨T ⟩.T ′this)
Tl2R = funcArgResidual (Tl2,Tx ,Cx .TxST )
∆
′ = ∆, l1 ∶ Tl1R , l2 ∶ Tl2R , l
′
1 ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Tthis , l ′2 ∶ C ′⟨T ′⟩.T ′l2
Note that l1 and l2 do not occur free in [l ′2/x][l ′1/this]e because otherwise (3a) would not
have been the case. Then we have (by weakening 4): Γ′;∆′ ⊢s [l ′2/x][l ′1/this]e ∶ T ⊣
∆, l1 ∶ Tl1R , l2 ∶ Tl2R , l
′
1 ∶ C⟨T ⟩.T ′this , l ′2 ∶ C ′⟨T ′⟩.TxST
(6) By rule Reentrancy-detection:
Γ
′;∆′ ⊢s [l ′2/x][l ′1/this]e ρ(l) ∶ T ⊣ ∆, l1 ∶ Tl1R , l2 ∶ Tl2R , l ′1 ∶ C⟨T ⟩.T ′this , l ′2 ∶ C ′⟨T ′⟩.TxST
which corresponds to the evaluation step in 1a. This also gives us that every indirect
reference has a contract type, as required by global consistency.
(7) Consider:
Tl1R = funcArgResidual (C⟨T ⟩.TST l1,C⟨T ⟩.Tthis ,C⟨T ⟩.T ′this)
T
′
l1 = funcArg (C⟨T ⟩.TST l1,C⟨T ⟩.Tthis ,C⟨T ⟩.T ′this)
If T ′l1 ≠ C⟨T ⟩.T ′this , there are two possibilities, both with C⟨T ⟩.Tthis = Unowned. If
C⟨T ⟩.TST l1 = TC .Shared, thenTl1R = TC .Shared; otherwise, maybeOwned (Tl1R). In both
cases, Tl1R ≈ T ′l1 and Γ ⊢ Tl1R <∶ T
′
l1. The same argument holds for l2 and its type. There-
fore:
∆, l1 ∶ Tl1R , l2 ∶ Tl2R , l
′
1 ∶ C⟨T ⟩.T ′this , l ′2 ∶ C ′⟨T ′⟩.TxST <lΓ,Σ′ ∆0, l1 ∶ T ′l1, l2 ∶ T ′l2
(8) By assumption of Γ, Σ,∆ ok, ξ contains mappings for each p ∈ PermVar (Γ). Note that ξ ′
additionally contains mappings for each TG and TD , so PermVar (Γ′) ⊂ {p ∣ ξ (p) = TST },
as required by global consistency. Finally, to show Γ′, Σ′,∆′ ok, we need to show that the
new types for l1 and l2 are compatible with the aliases in ∆
′.
First consider Tl1R and C⟨T ⟩.Tthis , which alias the object originally referenced with type
C⟨T ⟩.TST l1. By assumption (1c and 1b), C⟨T ⟩.TST l1 is compatible with all existing aliases
in Σ. Note that Tl1R = funcArgResidual (C⟨T ⟩.TST l1,C⟨T ⟩.Tthis ,C⟨T ⟩.T ′this).
Consider the cases for Tl1R :
Case: FuncArg-owned-unowned. Previously, l1 ∶ C⟨T ⟩.TST l1 was in ∆, and Γ′, Σ,∆ ok.
Now, ∆′ includes both C⟨T ⟩.Tthis and C⟨T ⟩.TST l1. But Tthis = Unowned, which is
compatible with all other references.
Case: FuncArg-shared-unowned. Previously, l1 ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Shared was in∆, and Γ′, Σ,∆ ok.
Now, ∆′ includes both C⟨T ⟩.Tthis and C⟨T ⟩.Shared. But Tthis = Unowned, which is
compatible with Shared.
Case: FuncArg-other. Previously, l1 ∶ C⟨T ⟩.TST l1 was in ∆, and Γ′, Σ,∆ ok. Now, ∆′
includes both C⟨T ⟩.Tthis and C⟨T ⟩.Unowned. But Unowned is compatible with all
other references.
The corresponding argument applies to l ′2.
Case: E-Inv-Private. e = l1.m⟨M⟩(l2) because e is closed.
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This case is similar to the E-Inv case, except that the fields are treated in a manner analogous
to arguments: the field states are part of the initial context; they are transformed via f uncArд;
and the resulting types are in the output context.
Case: E-IsIn-Dynamic-Match-Owned. e = if x inowned TST then e1 else e2 because e is closed.
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(b) Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.TST ⊢s if l is inowned S then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆′′
(c) Σ, if l is inowned S then e1 else e2 → Σ, e1
(2) By inversion:
(a) µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(. . .)
(b) Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.S ⊢s e1 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆∗
(c) S ∈ states(C⟨T ⟩)
(d) Sx = possibleStatesΓ (C⟨T ⟩.TST )
(e) Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ Owned
(f) Γ;∆0,x ∶ C⟨T ⟩.(Sx \ S) ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆∗∗
(g) ∆′′ =merдe(∆∗,∆∗∗)
(3) Let ∆′ = ∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.S . By 2b, Γ;∆′ ⊢s e1 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆∗.
(4) The difference between ∆ and ∆′ is that in ∆′, the type of l is C⟨T ⟩.S . To show that
Γ, Σ
′
,∆
′ ok, we need to show that µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(. . .). But this is given by (2a).
(5) By the merge subtyping lemma A.19, if l ∶ T ∈ merдe(∆∗,∆∗∗), then l ∶ T ′ ∈ ∆∗ with
Γ ⊢ T ′ <∶ T and T ′ ≈ T . Thus, ∆∗ <lΓ;Σ ∆
′′.
Case: E-IsIn-Dynamic-Match-Shared. e = if l is inshared S then e1 else e2
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Shared ok
(b) Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Shared ⊢s if l is inshared S then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆′′
(c) Σ, if l is inshared S then e1 else e2 → [ϕ, ρ(l)/ϕ] Σ, e1 ρ(l)
(2) By inversion:
(a) Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.S ⊢s e1 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆∗, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.TST
(b) Γ ⊢ bound (TST ) ≠ Unowned
(c) S ∈ stateNames (C)
(d) Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Shared ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆∗∗, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Shared
(e) ∆′′ =merдe(∆∗,∆∗∗), l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Shared
(f) µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(. . .)
(g) ρ(l) ∉ ϕ
(3) Let ∆′ = ∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.S . By State-mutation-detection and 2a, Γ;∆′ ⊢s e1 ρ(l) ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆′′′.
(4) The difference between ∆ and ∆′ is that in ∆′, the type of l is C⟨T ⟩.S . By (2f), we know
that µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(. . .). However, there may be other aliases to ρ(l) that have Shared
permission. Since ρ(l) is in the ϕ context of Σ′, any other references to ρ(l) must be
compatible with C⟨T ⟩.Shared , so we have Γ, Σ′,∆′ ok via StateLockCompatible .
(5) By the merge subtyping lemma A.19, if l ∶ T ∈ merдe(∆∗,∆∗∗), then l ∶ T ′ ∈ ∆∗ with
Γ ⊢ T ′ <∶ T . Thus, ∆∗ <lΓ;Σ ∆
′′.
Case: E–IsIn-Dynamic-Else. e = if l is inp S then e1 else e2
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(b) Σ, if l is inp S then e1 else e2 → Σ, e2
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(c) Γ;∆ ⊢s if l is inp S then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′′
(2) By inversion:
(a) µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S ′(. . .)
(b) S ′ ∉ S
(3) By inversion, either:
(a) Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Shared ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆∗; or:
(b) Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Sx \ S ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆∗∗
(4) If we are in case (3a), let ∆′ = ∆. Then by 3a, Γ;∆′ ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆∗. By assumption,
Γ, Σ,∆
′ ok. By the merge subtyping lemma A.19, if l ∶ T ∈merдe(∆∗,∆∗∗), then l ∶ T ′ ∈
∆
∗ with Γ ⊢ T ′ <∶ T . Thus, ∆∗ <lΓ;Σ ∆
′′.
(5) Otherwise, let ∆′ = ∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Sx \ S . Then by 3b, Γ;∆′ ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆∗∗. By inversion,
we had Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.TST ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆∗∗. As a result, there are no other owning
references to the object referenced by l , and the referenced object is in state S ′ by (2a). Since
S
′ ∉ S , C⟨T ⟩.Sx \ S is a consistent type for the reference, and Γ, Σ,∆′ ok. By the merge
subtyping lemma A.19, if l ∶ T ∈ merдe(∆∗,∆∗∗), then l ∶ T ′ ∈ ∆∗∗ with Γ ⊢ T ′ <∶ T .
Thus, ∆∗∗ <lΓ;Σ ∆
′′.
Case: E-IsIn-PermVar
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(b) Γ;∆ ⊢s if l is inPerm p then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′′
(c) Σ, if l is inPerm p then e1 else e2 → Σ, if l is inPerm TST then e1 else e2
(2) By inversion:
(a) ξ (p) = TST
(b) Γ;∆, l ∶ TC .p ⊢s e1 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′
(c) Γ;∆, l ∶ TC .T
′
ST ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′′
(d) ∆f =merдe(∆′,∆′′)
(e) Perm = ToPermission (T ′ST )
(3) In order to perform substitution for type parameters, we must have proved subsOkΓ (T ,TG),
so we must have Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ p. Then by 2b and the permission variable substitution
lemma A.10, we have Γ;∆, l ∶ TC .TST ⊢s e1 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′.
(4) We proceed by case analysis on TST .
Subcase: TST = S
If P = Unowned, then T ′ST = Unowned, and by 2c we can apply T-IsIn-Unowned to
show Γ;∆, l ∶ TC .Unowned ⊢s if l is inUnowned S then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′
f .
If P = Shared, then T ′ST = Shared, and by 2c we can apply T-IsIn-Dynamic to show
Γ;∆, l ∶ TC .Shared ⊢s if l is inshared S then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′
f .
If P = Owned, then Γ ⊢ T ′ST <∶ Owned, so maybeOwned (TC .T ′ST ), and Γ ⊢ Sx <∶∗
T
′
ST , where Sx = possibleStatesΓ (TC .TST ). Then by the subtype substitution lemma
lemma A.4 and by 2c we have Γ;∆, l ∶ TC . (Sx \ S) ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆′′. Now we can apply T-
IsIn-StaticOwnership to get Γ;∆, l ∶ TC .T
′
ST ⊢s if l is inowned S then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′
f .
Subcase: TST = P
If Γ ⊢ Perm <∶∗ P , then by IsIn-Permission-Then,
Γ;∆, l ∶ TC .TST ⊢s if l is inPerm P then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′
f .
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Otherwise, Γ ⊢ Perm /<∶∗ P , so by 2c and IsIn-Permission-Else, Γ;∆, l ∶ TC .TST ⊢s
if l is inP Perm then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′
f .
Subcase: TST = q This case is impossible, because ξ only maps to nonvariable states and
permissions.
(5) In all cases, global consistency is maintained because the environment does not change,
∆
′
f <
l
Γ,Σ′ ∆
′ by reflexivity.
Case: E-IsIn-Permission-Then By assumption, and because e is closed:
(1) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(2) Γ;∆ ⊢s if l is inP Perm then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′′
(3) Σ, if l is inP Perm then e1 else e2 → Σ, e1
By inversion:
(1) Perm ∈ {Owned,Unowned, Shared}
(2) ⋅ ⊢ P <∶∗ Perm
To prove that e is well-typed, we must have used either IsIn-Permission-Then or IsIn-
Permission-Else. However, we know that ⋅ ⊢ P <∶∗ Perm, so we must have used IsIn-
Permission-Else. Then by inversion of IsIn-Permission-Then, we have Γ;∆0,x ∶ TC .TST ⊢s
e1 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′′′.
Let ∆′ = ∆0,x ∶ TC .TST . Global consistency is maintained because the environment has not
changed, and ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ by <l -reflexivity.
Case: E-IsIn-Permission-Else By assumption, and because e is closed:
(1) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(2) Γ;∆ ⊢s if l is inP Perm then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′′
(3) Σ, if l is inP Perm then e1 else e2 → Σ, e2
By inversion:
(1) Perm ∈ {Owned,Unowned, Shared}
(2) ⋅ ⊢ Perm <∶∗ P
(3) P ≠ Perm
To prove that e is well-typed, we must have used either IsIn-Permission-Then or IsIn-
Permission-Else. However, we know that ⋅ ⊢ Perm <∶∗ P and P ≠ Perm, so we must
have used IsIn-Permission-Else. Then by inversion of IsIn-Permission-Else, we have Γ;∆,x ∶
TC .TST ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′. Global consistency is maintained because the environment has not
changed, and ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ by <l -reflexivity.
Case: E-IsIn-Unowned By assumption, and because e is closed:
(1) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(2) Γ;∆ ⊢s if l is inUnowned S then e1 else e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′′
(3) Σ, if l is inUnowned S then e1 else e2 → Σ, e2
By inversion:
(1) Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .TST ⊢s e2 ∶ T1 ⊣ ∆
′′
e2 is well typed by 1. Global consistency is maintained because the environment has not
changed, and ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ by <l -reflexivity.
Case: E-Box-ϕ. e = v o .
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(b) Γ;∆ ⊢s v o ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′′
(c) Σ, v o → [(ϕ \ o)/ϕ] Σ,v
(2) By inversion:
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(a) Γ;∆ ⊢s v ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′′
(3) Note that e o can only arise in the context of a shared-mode dynamic state test. Therefore,
∆ must be of the form ∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Shared and ∆′′ must be of the form ∆′′0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Shared .
(4) Since v is a value, either v = () or there exists o′ such that v = o′. If v = (), then let ∆′ = ⋅.
By T-(), Γ; ⋅ ⊢() unit ∶ ⋅ ⊣ . Otherwise, v = o′ and by Var, there exists o′ ∶ T1 ∈ ∆ with
T1 ⇛ T2/T3. In that case, let ∆′ = ∆,o′ ∶ T1. The proof proceeds as in the E-lookup rule: by
Var, there exists ∆′′′ = o′ ∶ T3 such Γ;∆′ ⊢s o′ ∶ T ⊣ ∆′′′.
(5) ∆′′′ differs from ∆′′ only on bindings for o′, which is not relevant to the <l relation, so
∆
′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ by <l -reflexivity.
(6) Γ, Σ,∆′ ok by the split compatibility lemma.
Case: E-Box-ϕ-congr. e = e o .
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(b) Γ;∆ ⊢s e o ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′′
(c) Σ, e o → Σ
′
, e’ o
(2) By inversion:
(a) Σ, e → Σ′, e ′
(b) Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′′
(3) Let ∆′ = ∆. By 1a, Γ, Σ,∆′ ok. Note that ∆′′′ = ∆′′. ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ by <l -reflexivity. By
State-mutation-detection, Γ;∆′ ⊢s e
′
o ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′′.
Case: E-Box-ψ . e = v o .
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(b) Γ;∆ ⊢s v
o ∶ T ⊣ ∆′′
(c) Σ, v o → [(ψ \ o)/ψ ] Σ,v
(2) By inversion:
(a) Γ;∆ ⊢s v ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′′
(3) Let ∆′ = ∆. By 2a, Γ;∆′ ⊢s v ∶ T ⊣ ∆′′. Σ′ = [(ψ \ o)/ψ ] Σ. Note that the definition
of consistency does not depend on Σψ . With 1a, we conclude that Γ, Σ
′
,∆
′ ok. Note that
∆
′′′ = ∆′′. ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ by <l -reflexivity.
Case: E-Box-ψ -congr. e = e o .
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(b) Γ;∆ ⊢s e
o ∶ T ⊣ ∆′′
(c) Σ, e o → Σ′, e’
o
(2) By inversion:
(a) Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′′
(b) Σ, e → Σ′, e ′
(3) Let ∆′ = ∆. By 1a, Γ, Σ,∆′ ok. Note that ∆′′′ = ∆′′. ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ by <l -reflexivity. By
Reentrancy-detection, Γ;∆′ ⊢s e
′
o
∶ T ⊣ ∆′′.
Case: E-State-Transition-Static-Ownership. e = l ↗owned S(l ′)
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
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(b) Σ, l ↗owned S(l ′)→ [µ[ρ(l)↦ C⟨T ⟩.S(ρ(l ′))]/µ] Σ, ()
(c) Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.TST ⊢l l ↗owned S(x) ∶ unit ⊣ ∆∗, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.S
(2) By inversion:
(a) Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ Owned
(b) Γ;∆0 ⊢l x ∶ T ⊣ ∆
∗
(c) Γ ⊢ T <∶ type(stateFields(C⟨T ⟩, S ′))
(d) unionFields(C⟨T ⟩,TST ) = Tf l fl
(e) f ieldTypesl (∆∗;Tf l fl ) = T ′f l
(f) Γ ⊢ disposable (T ′f l)
(3) Let ∆′ = ∆, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.S . By T-(), Γ;∆ ⊢l () ∶ unit ⊣ ∆. To show that Γ, Σ′,∆′ ok, it suffices
to show that anyT ∈ re f Types(Σ′,∆′, ρ(l)) that specifies state specifies typeC⟨T ⟩.S ′. But
note that by 1c, l is in the original typing context with an owning type. Since Γ, Σ,∆ ok,
and C⟨T ⟩.TST ∈ re f Types(Σ,∆, ρ(l)), the only owning alias to the object referenced by
l is l itself. Replacing l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.TST in ∆ with l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.S replaces the type of the only
owning alias with C⟨T ⟩.S , which is consistent with µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(l). ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆′′ by
<l -reflexivity.
Case: E-State-Transition-Shared. e = l ↗shared S(l ′)
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(b) Σ, l ↗shared S(l ′)→ [µ[ρ(l)↦ C⟨T ⟩.S(ρ(l ′))]/µ] Σ, ()
(2) Now, assume typing rule↗shared applied, since if↗owned applied, then the argument for
case E-State-Transition-Static-Ownership (above) applies. Then:
(a) Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.TST ⊢l l ↗shared S(x) ∶ unit ⊣ ∆∗, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.S
(3) By inversion:
(a) Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ Shared. By 2, we assume therefore TST = Shared.
(b) Γ;∆0 ⊢l x ∶ T ⊣ ∆
∗
(c) Γ ⊢ T <∶ type(stateFields(C⟨T ⟩, S ′))
(d) unionFields(C⟨T ⟩,TST ) = Tf l fl
(e) f ieldTypesl (∆∗;Tf l fl ) = T ′f l
(f) Γ ⊢ disposable (T ′f l)
(g) ρ(l) ∉ ϕ ∨ µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(. . .)
(4) There are two subcases.
Subcase: ρ(l) ∉ ϕ. Let ∆′ = ∆. By T-(), Γ;∆ ⊢l () ∶ unit ⊣ ∆. Now, all existing aliases to
the object referenced by ρ(l) were compatible with the previous reference, which was of
type C⟨T ⟩.Shared . As a result, none of those references restricted the state of the object,
and the new state (in Σ′) is consistent with ∆.
Subcase: µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(. . .). Let ∆′ = ∆. By T-(), Γ;∆ ⊢l () ∶ unit ⊣ ∆. All refer-
ences to the object referenced by ρ(l) have the same type in Σ′ as they did in Σ because
neither the contract nor the state of the object have changed, and we have Γ, Σ′,∆′ ok.
(5) In both cases, ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ by <l -reflexivity.
Case: E-Field. e = l . fi .
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
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(b) Σ, l . fi → Σ,oi
(2) By inversion:
(a) µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(s)
(3) Now, there are two subcases because there are two possible type judgments for e .
Subcase: this-field-def
(a) By assumption: Γ;∆0, l ∶ T ⊢l l . f ∶ T2 ⊣ ∆0, l ∶ T , l . f ∶ T3
(b) By inversion:
(i) l . f ∉ Dom(∆)
(ii) T1 f ∈ intersectFields(T )
(iii) T1 ⇛ T2/T3
(c) Let ∆′ = ∆0, l ∶ T , l . f ∶ T3,oi ∶ T2. Then by Var, Γ;∆′ ⊢s oi ∶ T2 ⊣ ∆′′′ for some ∆′′′.
Γ, Σ,∆
′ ok becauseT2 is a consistent permission for oi per the split compatibility lemma
(as in the E-lookup case). ∆′′′ agrees with ∆′′ on all l , so ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ by <l -reflexivity.
Subcase: this-field-ctxt
(a) By assumption: Γ;∆0, l ∶ T , l . f ∶ T1 ⊢l l . f ∶ T2 ⊣ ∆0, l ∶ T , l . f ∶ T3
(b) By inversion: T1 ⇛ T2/T3
Let ∆′ = ∆0, l ∶ T , l . f ∶ T3,oi ∶ T2. Then by Var, Γ;∆′ ⊢s oi ∶ T3 ⊣ ∆′′′ for some ∆′′′.
Γ, Σ,∆
′ ok because T2 is a consistent permission for oi per the split compatibility lemma.
∆
′′′ agrees with ∆′′ on all l , so ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ by <l -reflexivity.
Case: E-FieldUpdate. e = l . fi ∶= l ′.
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(b) Σ, l . fi ∶= l ′ → [µ[ρ(l)↦ C⟨T ⟩.S(o1,o2, . . . ,oi−1, ρ(l ′),oi+1, . . . ,o∣l .f ∣)]/µ] Σ, ()
(c) Γ;∆ ⊢l l . fi ∶= l ′ ∶ unit ⊣ ∆∗∗, l . fi ∶ TC .TST
(2) By inversion:
(a) µ(ρ(l)) = C⟨T ⟩.S(o)
(b) f ields(C⟨T ⟩.S) = T f
(c) Γ;∆ ⊢l l . fi ∶ TC .TST ⊣ ∆
∗
(d) Γ;∆∗ ⊢l l . fi ∶ TC .T
′
ST ⊣ ∆
∗∗
(e) Γ ⊢ disposable (TC .TST )
(3) Let ∆′ = ∆∗, l . fi ∶ TC .TST . By T-(), Γ;∆′ ⊢l () ∶ unit ⊣ ∆′.
(4) Note that Σ′ = [µ[ρ(l)↦ C⟨T ⟩.S(o1,o2, . . . ,oi−1, ρ(l ′),oi+1, . . . ,o∣l ∣)]/µ] Σ. By the same
argument used in the proof of preservation for the E-lookup case, Γ, Σ,∆∗ ok and likewise
Γ, Σ,∆
∗∗ ok. To show Γ, Σ′,∆′ ok, we note that the only change relative to Σ and ∆∗∗ is
regarding the type of l . fi . ρ(l) has the same number of fields in Σ′ as in Σ. Although ρ(l)
may now have an additional reference to ρ(l ′) that did not exist before, this reference
is compatible with all of the other references in re f Types(Σ′,∆∗, ρ(l ′)) because if the
new reference is owned, this is only because TC .TST was owned, which was previously
accounted for in re f Types(Σ′,∆∗, ρ(l ′)), and that ownership has been removed in ∆∗∗.
(5) ∆′′′ agrees with ∆′′ on all l , so ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ by <l -reflexivity.
Case: E-Assert. e = assert x in TST .
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(b) Σ, assert l in TST → Σ, ()
(2) There are two subcases:
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Subcase: TST = S . By assumption, Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.S ⊢s assert l in S ′ ∶ unit ⊣ ∆0, l ∶
C⟨T ⟩.S . Let ∆′ = ∆. By T-(), Γ;∆′ ⊢l () ∶ unit ⊣ ∆′. Since Σ′ = Σ, ∆′ = ∆, and Γ, Σ,∆ ok,
we have Γ, Σ′,∆′ ok.
Subcase: TST ≠ S . By assumption, Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.TST ⊢s assert l in TST ∶ unit ⊣ ∆0, l ∶
C⟨T ⟩.TST . Let ∆′ = ∆. By T-(), Γ;∆′ ⊢l () ∶ unit ⊣ ∆′. Since Σ′ = Σ, ∆′ = ∆, and
Γ, Σ,∆ ok, we have Γ, Σ′,∆′ ok.
Case: E-Disown. e = disown l .
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(b) Σ,disown l → Σ, l
(2) There are two subcases:
Subcase: Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.S ⊢s disown l ∶ unit ⊣ ∆0, l ∶ T ′. By inversion,C⟨T ⟩.S ⇛ T/T ′.
Let ∆′ = ∆′′. By T-(), Γ;∆′ ⊢s () ∶ unit ⊣ ∆′. Although the split compatibility lemma
does not precisely apply here, an analogous argument does: any other alias to the object
referenced by l was previously compatible with C⟨T ⟩.S , so we can see by case analysis
of the definitions of compatibility and splitting that such aliases are also compatible with
T
′.
Subcase: Γ;∆0, l ∶ C⟨T ⟩.Owned ⊢s disown l ∶ unit ⊣ ∆0, l ∶ T ′. By inversion,C⟨T ⟩.Owned ⇛
T/T ′. By T-(), Γ;∆′ ⊢l () ∶ unit ⊣ ∆′. Although the split compatibility lemma does not
precisely apply here, an analogous argument does: any other alias to the object referenced
by l was previously compatible with C⟨T ⟩.Owned , so we can see by case analysis of the
definitions of compatibility and splitting that such aliases are also compatible with T ′.
(3) In both subcases, ∆′′′ = ∆′′, so ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′′ by <l -reflexivity.
Case: E-Pack. e = pack.
(1) By assumption, and because e is closed:
(a) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(b) Σ,pack s → Σ, ()
(c) Γ;∆0, l ∶ T , l . f ∶ Tf ⊢l pack ∶ unit ⊣ ∆, l ∶ T . (Note that l . f ∶ Tf can be any subset of
the declared fields, including the empty subset.)
(2) By inversion:
(a) l . f ∉ dom(∆0)
(b) contractFields(T ) = Tdecl f
(c) Γ ⊢ Tf <∶ Tdecl
(3) Let ∆′ = ∆. By T-(), Γ;∆′ ⊢l () ∶ unit ⊣ ∆′. Note that every Tf is a subtype of Tdecl . The
impact on re f Types(Σ′,∆′,o) is that types defined for fields will replace types defined
in ∆. But because every replacement is a supertype of the type that it replaces, we have
Γ, Σ
′
,∆
′ ok by the subtype compatibility lemma (A.3).
□
Theorem A.3 (Asset retention). Suppose:
(1) Γ, Σ,∆ ok
(2) o ∈ dom(µ)
(3) re f Types(Σ,∆,o) = D
(4) Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′
(5) e is closed
(6) Σ, e → Σ′, e ′
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(7) re f Types(Σ′,∆′,o) = D ′
(8) ∃T ′ ∈ D such that Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (T ′)
(9) ∀T ′ ∈ D ′ ∶ Γ ⊢ disposable (T ′)
Then in the context of a well-typed program, either Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (T ) or e = E[disown s],
where ρ(s) = o.
Proof. By induction on the typing derivation.
Case: T-lookup. In (6), the only rule that could have applied is E-lookup, which leaves Σ un-
changed. ∆′ is the same as ∆ except that some instances of T1 have been replaced by T3. If
Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (T ), it is proved. Otherwise, Γ ⊢ disposable (T ), and by the definition of
split, Γ ⊢ disposable (T1) and Γ ⊢ disposable (T3), so there was no change in disposability
in ∆′, contradicting the conjunction of (8) and (9).
Case: T-Let. e = let x ∶ T = e1 in e2. There are two subcases, depending on the rule that was used
for Σ, e → Σ′, e ′:
Subcase: E-let. Σ′ has a new mapping for a new indirect reference l , which may cause an
additional alias to an object, but all previous aliases are preserved, so it cannot be the case
that all non-disposable references are gone.
Subcase: E-letCongr. The induction hypothesis applies to e1 because Σ, e1 → Σ
′
, e
′
1. This
suffices to prove the case because there are no changes to ∆.
Case: T-new. By rule E-New, Σ, new C⟨T ′⟩.S(l)→ [µ[o ↦ C⟨T ′⟩.S(ρ(l))]/µ] Σ,o. By inversion,
Γ;∆ ⊢s s ′ ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′. By the induction hypothesis, any nondisposable references in ∆ are
preserved in ∆′. The new Σ′ also preserves any existing nondisposable references.
Case: T-this-field-def. Rule E-field leaves Σ unchanged. By the split non-disposability lemma
(A.2), if Γ ⊢ disposable (T1), then Γ ⊢ disposable (T3). No other types are changed in the
typing context.
Case: T-this-field-ctxt. Same argument as for This-field-def.
Case: T-fieldUpdate. Although Σ′ replaces a field, which may reference an object, the reference
that was overwritten was disposable (by inversion).
Case: T-inv. The changes in ∆ consist of replacing types with the results of f uncArд. Σ′ has
additional aliases to objects, but additional aliases cannot cause loss of owning references.
We consider the cases for f uncArд:
FuncArg-owned-unowned. This case preserves ownership in the output type.
FuncArg-shared-unowned. The input type here is not owned.
FuncArg-other. If owned(TC .TST input−decl ), then in ∆, the corresponding variable is an
owning type. By substitution, ownership of the object will be maintained in the next
context.
This represents a contradiction with the assumption that ownership was lost.
Case: T-privInv. This case is analogous to the case for Public-Invoke, but with additional aliases
changed due to fields.
Case: T-↗p . e = s ↗p S ′(x). A rule E− ↗p applied, replacing an object that previously had a
type consistent with C⟨TA⟩.TST in µ with one that references an object in state S ′. The new
static context contains an owning reference to the new object, so ownership of s was not lost.
For the dynamic context Σ′, it suffices to examine the references from fields of the old object
(µ(ρ(l))). It remains to consider the fields that were overwritten, but these all had types that
were disposable (by inversion of T-↗p ).
Case: T-assertStates. This rule causes no change in either ∆ or Σ, which is a contradiction.
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Case: T-assertPermission. This rule causes no change in either ∆ or Σ, which is a contradiction.
Case: T-assertInVar. This rule causes no change in either ∆ or Σ, which is a contradiction.
Case: T-assertInVarAlready. This rule causes no change in either ∆ or Σ, which is a contradiction.
Case: T-isInStaticOwnership. e = if x inowned S then e1 else e2.
(1) If E-IsIn-Owned-Then applies, Σ, e → Σ, e1 (and by the preservation lemma, e1 is well-typed).
By the same argument as for T-lookup, no ownership was lost in ∆′ and ∆′′; any consumed
ownership is now in T1. From the merging preserves nondisposability lemma (A.21), we
find a contradiction with the assumption that a type has changed from nondisposable to
disposable in this step.
(2) Otherwise, E-IsIn-Else applies, and the same argument applies to e2.
Case: T-isInDynamic. e = if x inshared S then e1 else e2. The same argument as in the T-
isInStaticOwnership case applies, except that the situation is even simpler because ∆ and ∆′
agree that x ∶ TC .Shared .
Case: T-IsIn-PermVar. The argument is the same as for T-isInDynamic.
Case: T-IsIn-Perm-Then. E-IsIn-Perm-Then applies, and, Σ′ = Σ. By the same argument as in
the T-Lookup case, no ownership was lost in ∆′, which contradicts the assumption.
Case: T-IsIn-Perm-Else. The argument is the same as for T-IsIn-Perm-Then, but with E-IsIn-
Perm-Else.
Case: T-IsIn-Unowned. The argument is the same as for T-IsIn-Perm-Then, but with E-IsIn-
Unowned.
Case: T-disown. Then e = disown s .
Case: T-pack. Note that pack leaves Σ unchanged; the only change is removing s . f ∶ Tf from ∆.
But by inversion,Tf ≈ Tdecl . As a result, no ownership can change from ∆ to ∆′, contradicting
the assumptions.
Case: T-state-mutation-detection. e = e ′ o . The step must have been either via E-Box-ϕ or via
E-Box-ϕ-congr.
Case: E-Box-ϕ. The change in E-Box-ϕ and state-mutation-detection has no impact on
ownership, so this contradicts the assumptions.
Case: E-Box-ϕ-congr. We have the required property by the induction hypothesis, since the
present rules make no changes themselves to ∆′ and Σ′, which were provided inductively.
Case: T-reentrancy-detection. e = e ′
o
. The step must have been either via E-Box-ψ or via
E-Box-ψ -congr.
Case: E-Box-ψ . The change in E-Box-ψ and state-mutation-detection has no impact on
ownership, so this contradicts the assumptions.
Case: E-Box-ψ -congr. We have the required property by the induction hypothesis, since the
present rules make no changes themselves to ∆′ and Σ′, which were provided inductively.
□
A.2 Supporting Lemmas
Lemma A.1 (Memory consistency). If Γ, Σ,∆ ok, then:
(1) If l ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.S ∈ ∆, then ∃o.ρ(l) = o and µ(o) = C⟨T ′⟩.S(s).
(2) If Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′, and l is a free variable of e , then l ∈ dom(ρ).
Proof.
(1) Assume l ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.S ∈ ∆. Then ρ(l) = o follows by inversion of global consistency. µ(o) =
C
∗⟨T∗⟩.S ′(o′) follows by inversion of reference consistency (which itself follows by inversion
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of global consistency). By inversion of reference consistency, ⋅ ⊢ C∗⟨T∗⟩.S ′ <∶ D. By
definition of refTypes, C⟨T ′⟩.S ∈ D, so ⋅ ⊢ C∗⟨T∗⟩.S ′ <∶ C⟨T ′⟩.S . This implies that C = C∗,
S = S ′, and ⋅ ⊢ T∗ <∶ T ′ (by definition of subtyping).
(2) By induction on the typing derivation, we prove that if l is a free variable of e , then l ∈ dom(∆).
Then the conclusion follows immediately from the definition of global consistency. We
consider some example cases:
Case: T-lookup. s ′ is a free variable, but s ′ ∶ T1 ∈ ∆.
Case: T-let. Any free variables in e must be in e1 or e2. The result is obtained by induction
on e1 and e2.
Case: s ↗p S
′(x). s is a free variable, but s ∶ C⟨TA⟩.TST ∈ ∆.
Case: T-assertStates. x is a free variable, but x ∈ dom(∆).
The remaining cases are similar to the above.
□
Lemma A.2 (Split Non-disposability). If T1 ⇛ T2/T3, and T1 is not disposable, then T2 is not
disposable.
Proof. By inspection of the definition of T1 ⇛ T2/T3 and owned . Note that in the Split-owned-
shared and Split-states-shared cases, although owned(T1), C is not an asset, which makes T1 dispos-
able. □
Lemma A.3 (Subtype Compatibility). If T ↔ T ′, and Γ ⊢ T ′ <∶ T ′′, then T ↔ T ′′.
Proof. By straightforward case analysis of the subtyping relation. □
Lemma A.4 (Subtyping reflexivity). For all types T , Γ ⊢ T <∶ T .
Proof. Case: unit. Rule Unit applies.
Case: TC .TST . By rule Refl in the definition of the subpermission relation, ruleMatching-definitions
applies.
□
Lemma A.5 (Exclusivity of isAsset/nonAsset). For all types T :
(1) If Γ ⊢ isAsset (T ) is provable, then Γ ⊢ nonAsset (T ) is not provable.
(2) If Γ ⊢ nonAsset (T ) is provable, then Γ ⊢ isAsset (T ) is not provable.
Proof. By straightforward case analysis of the isAsset and nonAsset rules. □
Lemma A.6 (Exclusivity of isVar/nonVar). For all types T :
(1) If isVar (T ) is provable, then nonVar (T ) is not provable.
(2) If nonVar (T ) is provable, then isVar (T ) is not provable.
For all declaration types TC :
(1) If isVar (TC) is provable, then nonVar (TC) is not provable.
(2) If nonVar (TC) is provable, then isVar (TC) is not provable.
For all permissions/states TST :
(1) If isVar (TST ) is provable, then nonVar (TST ) is not provable.
(2) If nonVar (TST ) is provable, then isVar (TST ) is not provable.
Proof. By straightforward case analysis of the isVar and nonVar rules. □
Lemma A.7 (Exclusivity of maybeOwned/notOwned). For all types T :
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(1) If maybeOwned (T ) is provable, then notOwned (T ) is not provable.
(2) If notOwned (T ) is provable, then maybeOwned (T ) is not provable.
Proof. By straightforward case analysis of the ownedState and notOwned rules. □
Definition A.1 (Non-disposability).
maybeOwned (TC .TST ) Γ ⊢ isAsset (TC .TST )
Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (TC .TST ) ND-owned
Lemma A.8 (Exclusivity of disposability and non-disposability). For all types T :
(1) If Γ ⊢ disposable (T ) is provable, then Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (T ) is not provable.
(2) If Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (T ) is provable, then Γ ⊢ disposable (T ) is not provable.
Proof. (1) Consider the cases for Γ ⊢ disposable (T ).
Case: D-Owned. LetT = TC .TST . By inversion,maybeOwned (TC .TST ) and Γ ⊢ nonAsset (TC .TST ).
Then we cannot prove nonDisposable , which requires Γ ⊢ isAsset (TC .TST ).
Case: D-not-owned. There is no rule by which to prove Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (T ).
Case: D-Unit. There is no rule by which to prove Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (T ).
(2) To prove Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (T ), we must use ND-Owned; so T = TC .TST , and we must
show that maybeOwned (TC .TST ) and Γ ⊢ isAsset (TC .TST ). But this directly contradicts
the premises of D-not-owned and D-owned, and D-unit does not apply. So there is no rule by
which to prove Γ ⊢ disposable (T ).
□
Lemma A.9 (Interface substitution). If
(1) Γ;∆, s ′ ∶ I⟨T ⟩.TST ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆′
(2) Γ ⊢ C⟨T ′⟩ <∶ I⟨T ⟩
(3) C ok
then Γ;∆, s ′ ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.TST ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆′′, where
(1) if s ′ ∶ I⟨T ⟩.T ′ST ∈ ∆′, then ∆′′ = ∆′, s ′ ∶ C⟨T ′⟩.T ′ST
(2) otherwise ∆′′ = ∆′.
Proof. By induction on the typing derivation. The relevant cases are Inv and P-Inv; all other
cases will be identical, because x has the same permission or state. Because interfaces don’t have
fields, there must not be any field assignments or access involving x , so we don’t need to consider
those.
Case: Inv In this case, e = s1.m⟨TM⟩(s2).
If s ′ = s1, with the assumption thatm ok in C , we have:
(1) transactionΓ (m⟨TM⟩, I⟨T ⟩) = T m⟨T ′M⟩(TCx .Tx ⟫TxST x) Tthis ⟫ T ′this
(2) C ok
(3) Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ Tthis
(4) Γ ⊢ Ts2 <∶ TCx .Tx
(5) T ′s1 = f uncArд(TC .TST s1,TC .Tthis ,TC .T ′this)
(6) T ′s2 = f uncArд(Ts2,Tx ,TCx .TxST )
So then
(1) transactionName (m) ∈ transactionNames (C)
(2) tde f (m,C) = M = T ′ m⟨T ′M⟩(T ′Cx .T ′x ⟫T ′xST x) T∗this ⟫ T∗∗this
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(3) implementOkΓ (I⟨T ⟩,M).
By definition of implementOk, this implies that the invocation is still well-typed.
If s ′ ∈ s2, then Γ ⊢ I⟨T ⟩.T∗ST <∶ T for some argument of type T . But then because subtyping
is transitive, C ′⟨T ′⟩.T∗ST is also a subtype of T , so the invocation is still safe.
Case: P-Inv Identical to the Inv case, except that we cannot invoke a private transaction on s ′, as
interfaces do not have private transactions, so s ′ must be one of the arguments.
□
Lemma A.10 (Permission Variable Substitution). Suppose
(1) Γ ⊢ TST <∶∗ p
(2) Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .p ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′
Then Γ;∆,x ∶ TC .TST ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′.
Proof. Follows from A.4 □
Lemma A.11 (Exclusivity of subpermission). For any permissions P and P ′:
(1) If ⋅ ⊢ P <∶∗ P ′ is provable, then ⋅ ⊢ P /<∶∗ P ′ is not provable.
(2) If ⋅ ⊢ P /<∶∗ P ′ is provable, then ⋅ ⊢ P <∶∗ P ′ is not provable.
Proof. By case analysis of the subpermission rules, we can see that every pair of permissions
is related. The only way that ⋅ ⊢ P <∶∗ P ′ and ⋅ ⊢ P ′ <∶∗ P can be true is if P = P ′, but then we
cannot prove ⋅ ⊢ P /<∶∗ P ′. □
Lemma A.12 (Split compatibility). If Γ;∆ ⊢s s ′ ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′ and Γ, Σ,∆ ok then Γ, Σ,∆′ ok.
Proof. For one expression, it suffices to show that replacing T with T3 in ∆ leaves the re-
maining context consistent with Σ. The proof of this is by cases of splitting; this is theorem
splittingRespectsHeap in heapLemmasforSplitting.agda. For multiple expressions, simply iter-
ate the argument. □
Lemma A.13 (Substitution). If Γ;∆,x ∶ Tx ⊢s e ∶ T
′ ⊣ ∆′,x ∶ T ′x , then Γ;∆, l ∶ Tx ⊢s [l/x]e ∶
T
′ ⊣ ∆′, l ∶ T ′x
Proof. Substitute l for x throughout the previous proof. □
Lemma A.14 (Subtype replacement). If
• Γ;∆,x ∶ Tx ⊢s e ∶ T
′ ⊣ ∆′,x ∶ T ′x
• Γ ⊢ T ′′x <∶ Tx
• T ′′x ≈ Tx
then Γ;∆,x ∶ T ′′x ⊢s e ∶ T
′ ⊣ ∆′,x ∶ T ′′′x where Γ ⊢ T
′′′
x <∶ T
′
x .
Proof. By induction on the typing derivation and the subtyping derivation. Relevant cases
include:
Case: T-lookup.
(1) By assumption:
(a) Γ ⊢ T ′′x <∶ Tx
(2) By inversion of T-lookup:
(a) Tx ⇛ T
′/T ′x
(3) Note that it suffices to show that T ′′x ⇛ T
′/T ′′′x . Consider the cases for 2a:
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Case: Split-unowned T ′x = TC .Unowned. Split-Unowned applies to T
′′
x , resulting in
T
′′′
x = TC .Unowned.
Case: Split-shared By assumption, Tx = TC .Shared. If T ′′x = TC .Shared, then the re-
sult follows by Split-Shared. Otherwise, maybeOwned (T ′′x ), but this contradicts the
assumption that T ′′x ≈ Tx .
Case: Split-owned-shared By inversion of maybeOwned, we have the following cases:
Subcase: Tx = TC .p All subtypes of TC .p are themselves maybeOwned and nonAsset,
so Split-owned-shared applies.
Subcase: Tx = TC .Owned All subtypes ofTC .Owned are themselves maybeOwned and
nonAsset, so Split-owned-shared applies.
Subcase: Tx = TC .S All subtypes of TC .S are themselves maybeOwned and nonAsset,
so Split-owned-shared applies.
Case: Split-unit Tx = T ′x = unit. Split-unit applies for T
′′
x , since the only subtype of unit
is unit. Then T ′′′x = unit, which is a subtype of T
′
x .
Case: T-IsIn-StaticOwnership. Γ ⊢ T ′′x <∶ Tx results in a smaller set of initial possible states for
x , resulting in a potentially smaller set of possible states for x in the resulting context. This
explains why it is not necessarily the case that T ′′′x = T
′′
x .
□
Corollary A.4 (Subtype substitution). If
• Γ;∆,x ∶ Tx ⊢s e ∶ T
′ ⊣ ∆′,x ∶ T ′x and
• Γ ⊢ T ′′x <∶ Tx
then Γ;∆, l ∶ T ′′x ⊢s [l/x]e ∶ T ′ ⊣ ∆′, l ∶ T ′′′x where Γ ⊢ T ′′′x <∶ T ′x .
Proof. Follows by applying both A.14 and A.13. □
Corollary A.5 (l-stronger substitution). If Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′ and ∆′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆, then
Γ;∆′′ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′′′ with ∆′′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆
′.
Proof. By induction on ∆′, applying A.4 and the definition of ∆′′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆. □
Lemma A.15 (l-stronger consistency). If ∆′ <lΓ,Σ′ ∆ and Γ, Σ,∆ ok then Γ, Σ,∆
′ ok.
Proof. By induction on ∆ and application of subtype compatibility (A.3). □
Lemma A.16 (Strengthening). If Γ;∆, s ′ ∶ T0 ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′
, s
′ ∶ T1, and s
′ does not occur free in
e , then Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′.
Proof. By induction on the typing derivation. Since s ′ does not occur free in e , s ′ must not be
needed in either proof. □
Lemma A.17 (Weakening). If Γ;∆ ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′, and s ′ does not occur free in e , then Γ;∆, s ′ ∶
T0 ⊢s e ∶ T ⊣ ∆
′
, s
′ ∶ T1.
Proof. By induction on the typing derivation. Since s ′ does not occur free in e , s ′ must not be
needed in either proof. □
Lemma A.18 (Merge consistency). If Γ, Σ,∆ ok and Γ, Σ,∆′ ok, then Γ, Σ,merдe(∆,∆′) ok.
Proof. By induction onmerдe(∆,∆′).
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Case: Sym. By the induction hypothesis, Γ, Σ,merдe(∆′,∆) ok, andmerдe(∆′,∆) =merдe(∆,∆′).
Case: ⊕. By inversion, ∆ = ∆′′,x ∶ T and ∆′ = ∆′′′,x ∶ T ′. Because ∆′′ is a subset of ∆′′,x ∶(T ⊕ T ′), by the induction hypothesis, Γ, Σ,merдe(∆′′,∆′′′) ok (the induction hypothesis
applies because dom(∆′′) ⊂ dom(∆′′,x ∶ (T ⊕ T ′)) and ∆′′(x ′) = ∆(x ′) for all x ≠ x ′).
Therefore, by the definition of consistency, it suffices to show that T ⊕T ′ is compatible with
all T ′′ ∈ re f Types(Σ,∆′′). We assume that either T ′′ ↔ T or T ′′ ↔ T ′.
Subcase: T ⊕T = T . Anything compatible with T is trivially compatible with T.
Subcase: TC .Owned ⊕TC .S = TC .Owned . IfT ′′ is compatiblewithTC .Owned , then it is proved.
Otherwise, T ′′ is compatible with TC .S (by inspection of the definition of↔). In particular,
T
′′ must be TC .Unowned , in which case rule UnownedOwnedCompat applies.
Subcase: TC .Shared ⊕TC .Unowned = TC .Unowned . If T ′′ is compatible with TC .Unowned ,
then it is proved. Otherwise, T ′′ is compatible with TC .Shared , and by definition of↔,
either T ′′ = TC .Shared or T ′′ = TC .Unowned . The later case was already addressed, and in
the former case, SharedCompat gives T ′′ ↔ TC .Shared .
Subcase: TC .S ⊕TC .S ′ = TC .(S ∪ S ′). The only compatibility rule that could have applied
was UnownedStatesCompat, and it still applies to TC .(S ∪ S ′).
Subcase: C⟨T ⟩.TST ⊕ I⟨T ′⟩.T ′ST = I⟨T ⊕T ′⟩.TST ⊕ I⟨T ⊕T ′⟩.T ′ST = I⟨T∗⟩.T∗ST . IfT ′′ is com-
patible with C⟨T ⟩.TST , then it will also be compatible with I⟨T∗⟩.T∗ST by SubtypeCompat,
ParamCompat, and application of one of the other subcases forT∗ST . IfT
′′ is compatible with
I⟨T ′⟩.T ′ST , then it will also be compatible with I⟨T∗⟩.T∗ST by ParamCompat and application
of one of the other subcases for T∗ST .
Subcase: D⟨T ⟩.TST ⊕ D⟨T ′⟩.T ′ST = D⟨T ⊕T ′⟩.TST ⊕ D⟨T ⊕T ′⟩.T ′ST = D⟨T∗⟩.T∗ST . IfT ′′ is com-
patible with D⟨T ⟩.TST , then it will also be compatible with D⟨T∗⟩.T∗ST by ParamCompat,
and application of one of the other subcases for T∗ST . If T
′′ is compatible with D⟨T ′⟩.TST ,
then it will also be compatible with D⟨T∗⟩.T∗ST by ParamCompat, and application of one
of the other subcases for T∗ST .
Case: Dispose-disposable. Eliminating a variable from a context that is already consistent with
Σ leaves a context that is still consistent with Σ. Note that this rule does not allow removing
bindings of the form x . f ∶ T because removing those bindings could result in inconsistencies,
since then the types of those fields would (incorrectly) be assumed to be according to their
declarations.
□
Lemma A.19 (Merge Subtyping). If l ∶ T ∈merдe(∆∗,∆∗∗), then l ∶ T1 ∈ ∆∗ and l ∶ T2 ∈ ∆∗∗
with Γ ⊢ T1 <∶ T , Γ ⊢ T2 <∶ T , T1 ≈ T , and T2 ≈ T .
Proof. By induction on the merge judgment.
Case: Sym. The conclusion follows immediately from the induction hypothesis.
Case: ⊕. In each subcase, the conclusion follows from the induction hypothesis and the ⊕ subtyp-
ing lemma (A.20).
Case: Dispose-disposable. d ∉merдe(∆∗,∆∗∗), so the conclusion follows immediately from the
induction hypothesis.
□
Lemma A.20 (⊕ subtyping). If T1 ⊕T2 = T , then Γ ⊢ T1 <∶ T and Γ ⊢ T2 <∶ T .
Proof. Case: T ⊕T . It is proved by reflexivity of <∶.
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Case: TC .Owned ⊕TC .S . Γ ⊢ TC .Owned <∶ TC .Owned and Γ ⊢ TC .S <∶ TC .Owned .
Case: TC .Shared ⊕TC .Unowned . Γ ⊢ TC .Shared <∶ TC .Unowned and Γ ⊢ TC .Unowned <∶
TC .Unowned .
Case: TC .S ⊕TC .S ′. Γ ⊢ TC .S <∶ TC .(S ∪ S ′) and Γ ⊢ TC .S ′ <∶ TC .(S ∪ S ′).
Case: C⟨T ⟩.TST ⊕ I⟨T ⟩.T ′ST . Γ ⊢ C⟨T ⟩.TST <∶ I⟨T ⟩.(TST⊕T ′ST ) and Γ ⊢ I⟨T ⟩.T ′ST <∶ I⟨T ⟩.(TST⊕
T
′
ST ) by rule implements-interface and the induction hypothesis.
Case: D⟨T ⟩.TST ⊕ D⟨T ⟩.T ′ST . Γ ⊢ D⟨T ⟩.TST <∶ D⟨T ⟩.(TST⊕T ′ST ) and Γ ⊢ D⟨T ⟩.T ′ST <∶ D⟨T ⟩.(TST⊕
T
′
ST ) by rule Matching-Declarations and the induction hypothesis.
Note that in each of the above cases, T1 ≈ T2.
□
TheoremA.6 (Unicity of ownership). If Γ, Σ,∆ ok, ando ↦ C⟨T ⟩.S(. . .) ∈ µ, and re f Types(Σ,∆,o) =
D, then at most one T ∈ D is either C⟨T ⟩.S or C⟨T ⟩.Owned .
Proof. By inversion of reference consistency, ∀T1,T2 ∈ D,T1 ↔ T2 or (o ∈ Σϕ and Ti =
C⟨T ⟩.S and Tj = C⟨T ⟩.Shared(i ≠ j)). Note that C⟨T ⟩.Owned is not compatible with either
C⟨T ⟩.Owned or C⟨T ⟩.S , and C⟨T ⟩.S is not compatible with C⟨T ⟩.S . If there were more than one
alias of type C⟨T ⟩.Owned or C⟨T ⟩.S , they would be incompatible, which would be a contradiction.
Even if o ∈ Σϕ , the aliases are restricted to shared and state-specifying aliases, and never more
than one state-specifying alias exists. □
Lemma A.21 (Merging preserves nondisposability). Suppose ∆1,∆2 are static contexts. If
(s ∶ T ∈ ∆1 or s ∶ T ∈ ∆2), Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (T ), andmerдe(∆1,∆2) = ∆, then s ∶ T ′ ∈ ∆ such
that Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (T ′).
Proof. By case analysis onmerдe(∆1,∆2).
Case: Sym . The induction hypothesis applies tomerдe(∆,∆′) since the lemma was stated sym-
metrically.
Case: ⊕. Note that in all cases of the definition of T1 ⊕T2 = T3, if either owned(T1) or owned(T2),
then owned(T3)as well.
Case: Dispose-disposable. Without loss of generality, suppose s ∶ T ∈ ∆1. By inversion, x ∉ ∆2.
By assumption, Γ ⊢ nonDisposable (T ). But by inversion, Γ ⊢ disposable (T ). This is a
contradiction (A.8).
□
